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ABSTRACT  
 
In 1809 the Memoirs of Prince Eugene, of Savoy was published in Vienna. 
The book was written by Charles-Joseph de Ligne, a Flemish prince who lived 
seventy years after Eugene of Savoy, the general who commanded the army of the 
Holy Roman Empire in the War of the Spanish Succession. Eugene’s military 
career spanned fifty years and five wars, yet he is less known than his English 
counterpart, John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough. The memoirs were only 
attributed to Eugene for a short period and then tossed aside as the creative 
musings of a cultured prince who left quite the written legacy. Though attributed 
to the prince, a contemporary reader would not have thought that the manuscript 
had been penned by Eugene. The memoirs were heavily inspired by a biography 
by Eléazar Mauvillon, which was published only six years after Eugene’s death. 
Few of Eugene’s own letters survived his death, and he never wrote the memoirs 
of his own campaigns. Marlborough, by contrast, was a prolific letter writer, and 
the two generals spent some of the major campaigns of the war together with the 
result that Eugene has featured in much of the research done on Marlborough as a 
secondary character. Charles-Joseph de Ligne desired to be as good a writer as he 
was a soldier. His legacy included his own memoirs, which reflected the desire to 
be as successful as Eugene and to raise Eugene to the proper level of 
acknowledgement in military history. This thesis explores the historical memory 
of Eugene as perpetuated by Ligne’s literary creation as well as the historical 
context in which Eugene rose to fame for his military genius and proves the 
historical accuracy of Ligne’s mystification of Mauvillon’s biography.
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Europe of the early modern period was embroiled in wars over rights to 
crowns.1 European monarchs were mindful of the political climate of a changing 
Europe, and armies were built up to fight wars on multiple fronts. The War of the 
Spanish Succession, fought from 1701 to 1714, was the result of multiple claims 
to the Spanish throne. Emperor Leopold I of the Holy Roman Empire sought to 
assert a Habsburg claim, and King Louis XIV wished to unite France and Spain 
under the House of Bourbon. The Habsburg and Bourbon dynasties were the main 
competitors for Spain’s holdings, but the rest of Europe was concerned as well: a 
Spain allied with either France or the Holy Roman Empire would hold a 
monopoly in Europe.2 
Prince Eugene of Savoy found Vienna enmeshed in decades of political 
intrigue when he defected from the French court and took a position in the 
Imperial army, and the European theatre gave him the opportunity to become one 
of history’s great commanders. With the death of Charles II of Spain, Eugene 
found himself fighting to keep France and Spain from uniting. The war ended 
with a Frenchman sitting on the Spanish throne, but King Philip V of Spain 
renounced any claim he had to the French succession, and the Empire gained land 
holdings throughout Europe. 
                                                 
1
 Nicholas Henderson, Prince Eugen of Savoy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 
1964), 12. 
 
2
 John P. Spielman, Leopold I of Austria (New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press, 1977), 44-45. 
 2 
While the War of the Spanish Succession lasted fourteen years, it was 
based on two generations of political uncertainty. Philip IV’s inability to name an 
heir and Charles II’s questionable health left Leopold I and Louis XIV in a 
constant state of anticipation; the Spanish court’s changing loyalties between 
France and the Holy Roman Empire meant that conditions were perfect for 
Leopold and Louis to lobby for their own interests. The varying degrees to which 
the Spanish court was influenced by Imperial and French interests meant that 
Europe was constantly in flux over the issue of succession, culminating in the 
deathbed change of Charles’s will that replaced Leopold’s grandson with Louis’s. 
Because Charles died before the will was made public, Leopold and his 
supporters who did not wish to see Spain and France ruled by the same king had 
no time to sway the opinion of the Spanish court, which led to a continental war. 
Eugene’s choice of the Holy Roman Empire and his loyalty to the 
Habsburg monarchy epitomized the changing climate of Europe where a man 
born of an Italian mother and Savoyard father might eschew his birthplace of 
Paris in order to travel to Vienna. The French were one of the main enemies of 
Emperor Leopold I. Leopold had ascended the throne of the Habsburg Empire 
during Cardinal Giulio Mazarin’s attempt to reassert French authority in the 
Spanish Netherlands and the parts of Germany ruled by the Habsburgs; Habsburg 
fortresses lined the “Spanish Road” leading from northern Italy to the 
Netherlands, and France feared an invasion.3 Mazarin and King Louis XIV hoped 
                                                 
3
 Ibid., 41. 
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to fracture the Empire and perhaps destroy the Habsburg influence in Spain, 
assuring a Bourbon ruler on the Spanish throne.4 
In spite of his war record, little has been written about Eugene of Savoy. 
The most notable source attributed to him is an eighteenth-century “memoir” that 
was not written by him at all but by a Flemish prince, Charles-Joseph de Ligne, 
who was imitating a 1742 biography by Eléazar Mauvillon. Eugene’s estate was 
destroyed, and what is left of his writings is limited to his short dispatches and 
military notes from five wars. Two substantial biographies of Eugene exist, both 
in German, one written by Alfred von Arneth in 1858 and the other by Max 
Braubach in 1963. A few smaller biographies were published in English, notably 
by Nicholas Henderson and Derek McKay, but none of these biographies address 
Ligne’s memoirs, his reasons for writing them, or his inspiration from 
Mauvillon’s eighteenth-century biography. 
Eugene most often makes appearances in history books involving John 
Churchill, the first Duke of Marlborough who became a great general when 
England could only boast of a great navy. The two men commanded an allied 
army at the battles of Blenheim, Oudenaarde, and Malplaquet, as well as at the 
Siege of Lille during the War of the Spanish Succession. Since Marlborough’s 
personal letters and military dispatches are available, Eugene’s military career is 
often overshadowed by that of the prolific and charismatic Marlborough, but both 
                                                 
 
4
 Ibid. 
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generals were great commanders and fought valiantly throughout the course of 
their lives. 
Eugene’s life is not as well documented as Marlborough’s precisely 
because his personal letters have not survived. His legacy was destroyed upon his 
death. His one heir, his niece Maria Anna Victoria, had more desire for ready 
currency than she did for the items in her uncle’s estate. As a result Eugene has 
been relegated to a historical limbo where his existence is irrefutable but his 
character mysterious. By piecing together the research from the state archives that 
appear in the more modern biographies with the revelations from Marlborough’s 
letters, the episodes in Ligne’s memoirs and Mauvillon’s history begin to gain 
some historical premise. Mauvillon is obviously enamored with his subject, and 
Ligne must have shared an affinity for Eugene to attempt such a project; his 
memoirs reveal his motivations and the reasons he regarded Eugene as a personal 
hero. 
Eugene was not the only notable general of the War of the Spanish 
Succession, nor was he the only man who was not Austro-Hungarian to serve in 
the Imperial army. The multiethnic nature of the Holy Roman Empire and the 
multinational influence of the Habsburg monarchy meant that Vienna was a city 
of many languages ruled over by an Emperor with claims to many crowns. 
Eugene’s influence spread throughout Europe to a French prince who had planned 
to accompany him to the Imperial army; his influence also spread through 
generations to a Flemish prince who wished to emulate him. The History of 
Francis-Eugene, Prince of Savoy by Eléazar Mauvillon and the Memoirs of 
 5 
Prince Eugene, of Savoy by Prince Charles-Joseph de Ligne were influential 
pieces in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries but unknown today, whether the 
information contained therein was historically accurate or creatively dramatic. 
Prince Eugene of Savoy and the Memoirs of Prince Eugene 
“There are few figures in history about whom greater errors have been 
spread, and whose character more mischief has been made, and in whose name 
more wretched fabrications have been invented.”5 Though Eugene is not as 
famous as the Emperors for whom he fought, or even the generals with whom he 
commanded armies, he has not fallen into complete obscurity. The three-volume 
Imperial biography by Alfred von Arneth firmly placed him as a glorious hero of 
the Holy Roman Empire, which had dissolved in the Napoleonic era upon the 
abdication of Emperor Francis II. Arneth’s Eugene was “essentially a servant of 
the House of Habsburg but one conscious of the monarchy’s German character 
and a champion of the civilizing effects of German culture.”6 Max Braubach’s 
five-volume biography set Eugene as a Germanic folk hero as well as a brilliant 
and loyal soldier.  Braubach emphasized his involvement with Italian and French 
culture while maintaining his loyalty to the Holy Roman Emperor, whoever he 
may be.7 
                                                 
5
 Henderson, Prince Eugen, x. Attributed to A. Arneth. 
 
6
 Derek McKay, Prince Eugene of Savoy (London: Thames and Hudson, 1977), 
265. 
 
7
 Ibid. 
 6 
The English works, however, leave something to be desired. As Nicholas 
Henderson noted in the introduction to his work on Eugene, “no serious foreign 
work on him has ever been translated into English. No full-scale biography has 
ever been published in the English language.”8 In the canon of English history, 
Eugene is rarely overlooked, but he is overshadowed by the striking figure of 
John Churchill, the duke who was partially responsible for the great English 
victories at Blenheim, Oudenaarde, and Malplaquet. Henderson’s work certainly 
does something for raising the veil of obscurity from the Imperial general, but it is 
hardly a comprehensive analysis of the prince’s life on the scale of Arneth’s or 
Braubach’s. Derek McKay’s work, published after Braubach’s final volume, 
seeks to say something about Eugene as a statesman, not just as a patron of the 
arts and a soldier, which McKay saw as the limitations of Henderson’s book.9 
McKay certainly gave more attention to the politics of the War of the Spanish 
Succession, not just the strategies and outcomes. 
What both the German and English biographers were missing were those 
“wretched fabrications”. The Memoirs of Prince Eugene, of Savoy to this day are 
not always published with Charles-Joseph de Ligne’s name attached, nor does 
Ligne’s work merit a mention in sections involving how Eugene was perceived 
throughout Europe, the stories and rumors that surrounded him. How has this 
work, so derivative of Eléazar Mauvillon’s The History of Francis-Eugene, 
Prince of Savoy, considered by McKay as “a near contemporary biography, which 
                                                 
8
 Henderson, Prince Eugen, x. 
 
9
 McKay, Prince Eugene, 7. 
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has withstood time and modern research well,” escaped historical mention?10 
Mauvillon’s was one of the first biographies; certainly a mystification of it must 
have been well received. 
The issue in question is the historical realism of Charles-Joseph de Ligne’s 
The Memoirs of Prince Eugene, of Savoy. Whether they had been perceived as 
written by Eugene or another party, the Memoirs was certainly intended to be 
treated as biographical. They portray a man who is good at war but one who is 
firmly entrenched in the methods of a previous century. Because Ligne’s work 
was inspired by Eléazar Mauvillon, it is as good a contemporary source as any 
since it was based on a work that was published so soon after Eugene’s death, and 
the symmetry of the writing styles proves that Ligne’s Memoirs were meant to be 
perceived as a mystification and not as an original piece of work written by 
Eugene or someone else. 
Eugene of Savoy and Charles-Joseph de Ligne shared an allegiance to an 
Empire that was based not on birth but on tradition and opportunism. Eugene 
desired nothing but a military commission, and when he could not fight in the 
army of the country in which he was born, he sought another army and enjoyed a 
successful career that brought with it enough income to make himself 
comfortable. Charles-Joseph also wanted a military career, but he did not desire to 
just live an occupied and comfortable life; he wished to go down in history as a 
soldier-prince who left as much of a legacy in court as he did on the battlefield. 
                                                 
10
 Ibid., 265. The English version is “largely a translation” of Mauvillon’s five-
volume Histoire du Prince François Eugène de Savoye (1740). 
 8 
That required emulating a hero as well as creating a new kind of noble heroism 
that involved a written legacy. 
By comparing the texts of Mauvillon’s biography and Ligne’s mock 
autobiography, the character and career of Eugene become known, substantiated 
by the archival work of both the English and German historians. Charles-Joseph 
de Ligne was no aspiring writer; he was a prince, a member of the court of the 
Holy Roman Empire and a confidant of the Emperor, much as Eugene was. His 
life certainly influenced his choice of Eugene as a literary muse. Ligne’s memoirs 
of Eugene are not fabrications though its authorship may have been; the 
information within can often be corroborated by contemporary and modern 
writers, but there is also a personal tone that is lacking in the other works. John 
Churchill’s letters about his time with Eugene are evidence of Eugene as he 
actually was while in the field, where he spent much of his life. The culmination 
of these sources creates a Eugene who has often been hidden away by uncertainty. 
He was a fearless fighter and loyal servant, but above all he was a man who was 
driven by success in war. The work of Charles-Joseph de Ligne is not the 
memoirs of Eugene of Savoy, but it depicts the life of Eugene with historical 
accuracy.
 9 
Chapter 2 
BE YOU OF THE BLOOD OF HEROES: CHARLES-JOSEPH DE LIGNE 
AND EUGENE OF SAVOY 
Generations of intermarriage had left the great houses of Europe with 
claims, some legitimate and some tenuous, to the thrones of neighboring 
countries, and Europe in the eighteenth century was embroiled in war: the Great 
Northern War (1700-1721), the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), the 
War of the Polish Succession (1733-1738), the War of the Austrian Succession 
(1740-1748), and the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763) all dominated the first half 
of the century. It was in this Europe that two men with multinational identities 
became Imperial field marshals: Prince Eugene of Savoy and Prince Charles-
Joseph de Ligne. 
François-Eugène, Prince of Savoy-Carignan (1663-1736), was born to a 
French father and Italian mother, and he was brought up at the French court under 
King Louis XIV. Denied a post in the French army, Eugene traveled to Vienna, 
where he would spend six decades serving three Holy Roman Emperors: Leopold 
I, Joseph I, and Charles VI. His service in the Great Turkish War and the Nine 
Years’ War earned him promotions and accolades, and he became a commander 
in the War of the Spanish Succession and President of the Imperial War Council. 
He continued to fight and serve on behalf of the Holy Roman Empire until six 
months before he died. 
Charles-Joseph François Lamoral Alexis, Prince de Ligne (1735-1814), 
served an Austria under Empress Maria Theresia, who was ruling over lands only 
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ever held by men. He distinguished himself during the Seven Years’ War but 
retired to a life at court until he was called into active service during the War of 
the Bavarian Succession in 1778. Charles-Joseph spent his life both fighting and 
writing, and he left behind a legacy of history and commentary in his memoirs. 
Eugene’s legacy, however, was dependent on what people wrote about 
him, and Charles-Joseph considered him a hero worthy of emulation. As a small 
child, Charles-Joseph wished to become another Eugene, and as a young man 
living in Vienna, he had the lineage and the upbringing that allowed him to 
become a military success. Though Charles-Joseph had retired from the military 
at the turn of the nineteenth century, his hero-worship did not wane: he wrote the 
memoirs that Eugene had not written, perhaps as an exercise or as a commentary. 
Charles-Joseph was both a product of his time and of a time past. His 
education allowed him to study the careers of great generals, his family’s service 
to the great houses of Europe provided a military tradition, and the nature of 
Europe meant that sooner or later there would be a war in which he could fight. 
He put Eugene on a pedestal as the personification of how a man could become as 
glorious as the wars he fought, and Charles-Joseph crafted both his literary and 
military careers on the glorification of war. By using both pen and sword, 
Charles-Joseph de Ligne sought to become an artist of war, and Eugene of Savoy 
was his muse. 
The Princes de Ligne 
The chateau of Beloeil has been the home of the Princes de Ligne since 
the eleventh century. Situated in modern Belgium, it is surrounded by the English 
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Channel, France, the Netherlands, and Germany, acting as a fitting metaphor for 
the family’s European connections. Originally titled landowners in Hainaut, the 
Princes de Ligne served any number of monarchs in crusades and coups that 
defined European history.11 Foreign rulers—such as the Dukes of Burgundy, the 
Habsburg kings, and later the Habsburg Holy Roman Emperors—had control of 
the southern Netherlands, including Hainaut, through inheritances and treaties. By 
the seventeenth century, the members of the family de Ligne were not only 
princes in the Netherlands but also peers of Hainaut, Artois, and Flanders, 
grandees of Spain, and princes of the Holy Roman Empire.12 
In making European history, the Princes de Ligne were not merely pawns 
of other aristocrats and monarchs. Either as part of a strategy or because no 
neighboring aristocracy was deemed worthy, the Princes de Ligne married more 
foreign princesses—from Aragon, Liechtenstein, Lorraine, Luxembourg, and 
Nassau—than any other noble family in the province.13 These marriages allowed 
for advantageous connections, and by the eighteenth century they were seventh or 
                                                 
11
 Philip Mansel, Prince of Europe: The Life of Charles-Joseph de Ligne 1735-
1814 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003), 1. The family de Ligne fought in 
the Third Crusade with Richard I and Philip II and aided in Isabella of France’s 
overthrow of Edward II in 1326. 
 
12
 Ibid., 1-2. 
 
13
 Ibid., 2. 
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eighth cousins of the Holy Roman Emperor; the Kings of Spain, France, England, 
Prussia, and Poland; the Electoral Prince of Bavaria; and the Prince of Orange.14 
While the Princes de Ligne were proud of their Flemish identity and 
centered their world on Hainaut and Beloeil, they were also proud of their 
multinational roots. Charles-Joseph was raised in a Netherlands controlled by a 
popular ruler, Charles Alexander of Lorraine, cousin of the Princes de Ligne and 
brother-in-law to Empress Maria Theresia, who had married the last Duke of 
Lorraine before the duchy was absorbed by France.15 The Holy Roman Empire 
conducted its affairs differently from the centralized European states: its 294 
principalities, free cities, and ecclesiastical states stretching from the Baltic Sea in 
the north to the Adriatic in the south and from Flanders in the west to Silesia in 
the east were all loyal to the Holy Roman Emperor in Austria while also retaining 
some semblance of local sovereignty, and so a Flemish identity existed in 
conjunction with Austrian loyalty.16 
The family de Ligne became princes of the Holy Roman Empire in 1602, 
and they held a title that was sought after by the Polish, Hungarian, Russian, and 
German nobility. The gift of sovereignty allowed the Princes de Ligne access to a 
                                                 
14
 Félicien Leuridant, Une education de Prince au XVIIIe siècle (Brussels: 1923), 
14n; cf. Annales Prince De Ligne (Brussels, 1920-1938), V, 1924, Frederick 
William III of Prussia to Ligne, 19 August 1819, beginning Cher cousin; ibid., 
XIII, 1932, 82, Charles-Theodore Elector of Bavaria to Monsieur mon Cousin!, 
11 August 1783. Qtd. in Mansel, Prince of Europe, 1. 
 
15
 Mansel, Prince of Europe, 8. 
 
16
 Ibid., 10. 
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larger marriage pool and new sovereign territories.17 Charles-Joseph was baptized 
as the seventh Prince de Ligne on 23 January 1735 in Brussels.18 His mother, who 
died when he was only five years old, epitomized the practice of the Princes de 
Ligne marrying foreign royalty: she was a princess of an enclave of the Holy 
Roman Empire in eastern France, and only her adherence to the Catholic faith 
prohibited her from staking a better claim to the English throne than King George 
II.19 Charles-Joseph’s very name was a testament to the international nature of the 
Empire and the Emperors’ “gratitude for the zeal and fidelity of his family” as he 
was named Charles after his godfather, Emperor Charles VI, and Joseph after the 
previous Emperor.20 
Charles-Joseph idolized his ancestors who had “always been brave, from 
father to son; even the bastards, who glorified in being called so, and had the rank 
of nobles. I have seen a tomb with this inscription: ‘Bastard of Ligne, killed in 
Africa’.”21 His great-grandfather, president of the war council in Castile, viceroy 
of Sicily, and governor-general in Milan, had been imprisoned in Spain. Even his 
                                                 
17
 Ibid. 
 
18
 Ibid., 3. 
 
19
 Charles-Joseph de Ligne, Fragments de l’histoire de ma vie (1928), II, 349. 
Qtd. in Mansel, Prince of Europe, 3. Charles-Joseph’s mother was a descendant 
of a Catholic son while George II descended from a Protestant daughter of 
Charles I’s sister, Queen Elizabeth of Bohemia. 
 
20
 Leuridant, Une education, 7; Ligne, Fragments, I, 49n. Qtd. in Mansel, Prince 
of Europe, 14. 
 
21
 Charles-Joseph de Ligne, The Prince de Ligne: His Memoirs, Letters, and 
Miscellaneous Papers, trans. Katharine Prescott Wormeley (Boston: Hardy, Pratt 
& Company, 1899), I, 52. 
 14 
great-grandmother and his grandfather had been killed hunting boar.22 Charles-
Joseph’s home in Hainaut was within the “cockpit of Europe,” where, he wrote, 
“there has always been war,” and many cities in the Netherlands gave names to 
famous battles: Rocroi (part of the Thirty Years’ War in 1643), Ramillies and 
Malplaquet (part of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1706 and 1709), and 
Fontenoy (part of the War of the Austrian Succession in 1745).23 
Charles-Joseph’s father, Claude Lamoral II (1685-1766), was the 
gentleman Charles-Joseph wished to become: Claude was just as intimidating in 
the drawing room as he was on the battlefield, and his bravery had been 
particularly noted in the War of the Spanish Succession.24 When forced to 
surrender at Antwerp, he had said, “The enemy shall not have my flags, at any 
rate,” and he hid them from the conquering forces.25 Charles-Joseph’s uncle, Field 
Marshal Prince Ferdinand de Ligne, had fought in battles at Ramillies, 
Oudenaarde, and Malplaquet, and he nurtured his nephew’s love of war by having 
him spend time with the Ligne Dragoons.26 
Charles-Joseph’s romantic fascination with war was justified by a life 
spent preparing for, fighting in, and writing about war. France was often the 
                                                 
22
 Ibid. 
 
23
 Ligne, Noveau Recueil de Lettres, ed. Henri Lebasteur (Paris: 1926), 144. Qtd. 
in Mansel, Prince of Europe, 5. 
 
24
 Mansel, Prince of Europe, 3. 
 
25
 Ligne, Memoirs, Letters, Miscellaneous Papers, I, 53. 
 
26
 Ibid. 
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enemy: as the largest country in Europe, France outnumbered the Holy Roman 
Empire by 5 million people; England by 19 million; and the southern Netherlands 
by 23 million.27 Charles-Joseph’s first experience with war was when he was five: 
the War of the Austrian Succession pitted France against Maria Theresia and her 
claim to the Habsburg inheritance, which included the southern Netherlands. In 
another five years Charles-Joseph would have lived through four local sieges, one 
of which ended with his father and uncle held prisoner by the French, and he 
heard the victory cannons in Fontenoy when the French triumphed over the 
Habsburgs and their British allies. Because of Hainaut’s military history, Charles-
Joseph and Europe shared an opinion about France: it was a country always in 
search of war.28 This opinion was fostered by his uncle Ferdinand, who had spent 
so much of his life fighting the French, and Charles-Joseph wrote that he started 
and ended his life by hating France.29 
Though Charles-Joseph was expected to be a soldier and desired such an 
occupation, his childhood tutors also fostered in him a desire to be a great writer. 
As much as he studied and wished to emulate the great generals of the past, he 
also studied his own varied ancestry.30 He was taught that his family was “one of 
the oldest, most illustrious and most generous in Europe, a race of heroes and 
                                                 
27
 Mansel, Prince of Europe, 5. 
 
28
 Ibid., 6. 
 
29
 Ligne, Fragments, I, 91. Qtd. in Mansel, Prince of Europe, 6. 
 
30
 Mansel, Prince of Europe, 7. 
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generals descended from Charlemagne.”31 The antiquity of his ancestry was 
proven by the simplicity of the Ligne coat of arms: one diagonal pink ligne across 
a yellow background. The family motto, Que res cumque cadunt, stat semper 
linea recta, explicitly exemplified the family’s unflagging loyalty and implied 
devotion to the Empire.32 Charles-Joseph took what he learned and distilled it into 
his writings, impressing one of his tutors: “[Charles-Joseph] gave me some of his 
writings to read, above all a parallel between [Henri de la Tour d’Auvergne, 
Victomte de] Turenne and Eugène [of Savoy]; one cannot conceive the vivacity, 
the talent and the audacity there was in them and it was startling how well written 
it was when it was done so casually.”33 
Charles-Joseph’s education was later entrusted to two of Claude’s pages, 
who were both staff-officers. Thus a noble education turned into a military one 
with yet another tutor having returned from wars in Bohemia and Bavaria 
imparting his knowledge of military matters. His father’s court included many 
veteran officers who had retired to estates in the Ligne provinces, and thus 
Charles-Joseph took an academic interest in the military careers of his father’s 
contemporaries as well as those of classical generals such as Alexander the Great 
                                                 
31
 Leuridant, Une education, 40-42. Qtd. in Mansel, Prince of Europe, 7-8. 
 
32
 Mansel, Prince of Europe, 8, 14. “When other things fall, the Ligne always 
stands straight.” 
 
33
 Bibliothèque de l’Institut Mss 1651, Journal du Duc de Croÿ, November 1753, 
20 September 1754, 15 November 1754. Qtd. in Mansel, Prince of Europe, 9. 
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and Julius Caesar.34 He described himself as being “mad for heroism. Charles XII. 
[of Sweden] and [Louis II de Bourbon, Prince de] Condé kept me from sleeping. I 
even fancied I could do better than they.”35 In spite of his ambition, he was denied 
a military position because his father wanted him educated, and he wrote a 
“Treatise on Arms” at the age of fifteen to prove that he was worthy of his 
family’s regiments: 
No man was ever born who did not receive from Nature some 
dominant inclination which will lead him to success in one way or 
another. Unhappy he who allows it to escape him! He who was made, 
perhaps, to defend the Honour or the life of citizens is lost to the Country 
he was born to defend [….] The glory of arms sheds so dazzling a 
radiance that it conquers the soul at first glance [….] I find that glory to be 
that we render services, we endure pains, we receive praise. And what are 
the objects on which the Warrior’s eye is fixed as he renders service? His 
Prince, his Country, Justice. 
It is impossible to utter that word “Country” without remembering 
what the ancient Romans, filled with the most sublime Virtue, did for 
theirs. […] Heroes who sacrificed themselves for her good have left, no 
doubt, a great example to be followed, but do we need it? Is not love of 
Country innate within us? Does not the same bond that binds us to another 
attach us, each and all to the good of our common Mother?36 
The young prince already considered himself a part of the army, even if he had no 
formal appointment, because of his familiarity with his uncle’s dragoons. Even 
his young age was not a detriment: Turenne, who became a marshal general of 
France, “slept on a gun-carriage when he was ten; Hannibal swore eternal hatred 
to the Romans when he was nine.” Following the example of Hannibal, Charles-
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Joseph swore eternal hatred to the French and made the Holy Roman Empire his 
mother.37 
Charles-Joseph and the Holy Roman Empire 
Charles-Joseph was as aware of his Austrian allegiance as he was his 
European inheritance. He often referred to Austria as nous or chez nous, and his 
home stretched from Flanders through Austria to the French borders, including 
the modern countries of Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Croatia, and western Romania.38 The Holy Roman Empire’s desire to 
expand rivaled that of France, and the Empire’s ambition coupled with an 
inherent hatred of France provided Charles-Joseph with the opportunity to pursue 
his own dreams of military glory. Though Charles-Joseph himself primarily spoke 
French, he noted that his friend, who later became Emperor Joseph II, spoke 
French, German, Italian, Hungarian, Czech, and Latin, which typified the 
multinational nature of the Empire and its justification for expansion; Charles-
Joseph would witness the acquisition of new German, Polish, Italian, and 
Moldavian provinces. Unlike France, Prussia, or Russia, who were bound by 
linguistic borders, the Holy Roman Empire was defined by its lack of national 
identity, and Germans, Czechs, Croats, and Hungarians declared their loyalty to 
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Vienna rather than voiced nationalist sentiments.39 The Princes de Ligne also 
embraced this cosmopolitan identity. 
Charles-Joseph’s allegiance to the Empire would be partially defined by 
Prussia and Austria’s struggle for control of German provinces, starting with 
Frederick II’s conquering of Silesia in 1741. Frederick had sought to gain the 
service of Charles-Joseph’s father by soliciting a sign of allegiance in return for 
an estate in Westphalia, but Claude had retained his familial loyalty to Austria: 
“The house of the Prince de Ligne is accustomed to make still greater sacrifices to 
the august House of Austria, considering the inviolable fidelity which his 
ancestors have shown it for almost three centuries.”40 Like his father, Charles-
Joseph would fight with Austria against both Prussia and France. 
Charles-Joseph first arrived in Vienna with his father in 1751 and was 
immediately made a chamberlain by Emperor Francis I.41 He was very proud of 
this title—all chamberlains had to have eight noble ancestors on their father’s 
side—and he signed everything he wrote with “Charles de Ligne, chamberlain.”42 
His position at court acquainted him with many of the Empire’s great nobles, but 
he also befriended the many foreigners who came to Vienna. Because of the 
international make-up of the Empire, the Emperor had a great pool from which he 
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could attract talent; perhaps the Holy Roman Empire’s greatest jewel had been the 
half-French, half-Italian Prince Eugene of Savoy.43 
Four years after his arrival in Vienna, Charles-Joseph followed the family 
pattern of matrimony: he was married to Princess Francisca Xaviera of 
Liechtenstein. The Liechtensteins had been Austrian and Bohemian landowners 
for as long as the family de Ligne had owned land in Hainaut, and the 
arrangement provided Charles-Joseph a third connection to Austria after his status 
and his court appointment.44 The Liechtenstein family also nurtured Charles-
Joseph’s interest in the military. Prince Joseph Wenzel, his wife’s uncle, had 
spent much of his own money in developing the Austrian artillery, and he was 
known for the presents he made to sovereigns, his love for Austria, and his 
generous hospitality.45 He was very much like Charles-Joseph’s father in that 
way, conducting his affairs both on and off the battlefield with the same 
magnificence. He also made gifts of his military manuscripts and was more than 
willing to discuss military matters.46 
Serving in the court of Maria Theresia, Charles-Joseph developed much 
respect for the Empress and her preoccupation with the army, and it was “the only 
branch of state administration for which [Maria Theresia] harboured a real 
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personal interest.”47 She was called “mother of the camps”, and she in turn called 
the soldiers “my children.”48 As much as she wished to consolidate her power 
over the nobles, she also wished to honor her soldiers, and in 1751 she allowed all 
army officers to attend court receptions regardless of their birth; the following 
year saw the foundation of the Wiener Neustadt Military Academy.49 Austria had 
changed since the day of Charles-Joseph’s hero, Prince Eugene: the Austrian 
army boasted almost 250,000 soldiers, matching France and outnumbering 
Prussia.50 
As a young man, Charles-Joseph believed that “private interest, ambition, 
vengeance, the feelings of logic or resentment of the man or woman in favour 
which often affect decisions” were often mistaken for “profound political 
calculation. It is almost always personal factors which have started wars.”51 These 
were the “great causes of events throughout the centuries.”52 He in turn was 
forced to bite back his own childhood animosity when Austria formed an 
unprecedented alliance with France. Maria Theresia wished to recover Silesia, and 
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Louis XV harbored much hostility against Frederick II because, as Charles-Joseph 
believed, Frederick had made some impolitic remarks about Louis’s mistress, 
Madame de Pompadour.53 Thus personal hatred united two common enemies, and 
the Seven Years’ War began with Frederick’s refusal to wait for war to be brought 
to him: the Prussian army promptly invaded Saxony in 1756. Though he had had 
no formal military training, Charles-Joseph became a captain in his father’s 
regiment, the Ligne Infanteries.54 He kept a diary during the war, which was 
published forty years later.55 
The army was just as international as the Holy Roman Empire: “No other 
army of the time could have produced a column of regiments chattering variously 
in German, Czech, French, Flemish, Raeto-Romance, Italian, Magyar and Serbo-
Croatian, and all passing in review under the eyes of a general who was cursing to 
himself in Gaelic.”56 Within the Ligne Infanteries, Charles-Joseph would find 
himself commanding a mixture of Belgians, Germans, and Hungarians.57 
                                                 
53
 Mansel, Prince of Europe, 23. 
 
54
 Vicomte Charles Terlinden, ‘Le Prince de Ligne et les grandes guerres de son 
temps,’ Annales Prince de Ligne (Brussels: 1920-1938), XVI, 1935, 183. Qtd. in 
Mansel, Prince of Europe, 23. 
 
55
 Ligne, Mélanges Militaires, IV, 215-216; Pierre Mouriau de Meulenaker, “Le 
prince de Ligne et les memoires du Comte de Bussy Rabutin,” Nouvelles Annales 
Prince de Ligne (Brussels: 1986), IX, 86, 98. Qtd. in Mansel, Prince of Europe, 
24. 
 
56
 Duffy, Army of Maria Theresa, 13. Qtd. in Mansel, Prince of Europe, 24. Duffy 
trusts Charles- 
Joseph’s works as the best contemporary sources on the army of Maria Theresia. 
 
57
 Ligne, Mélanges Militaires, XIV, 59. Qtd. in Mansel, Prince of Europe, 24. 
 23 
Charles-Joseph found that the excitement of war and the passion he felt for 
the military was superior to what he felt for his many love affairs, and he thought 
victory was a woman who needed to be abducted.58 He quoted poetry while 
fighting battles, and when there were no battles, he would fire his cannons into the 
midst of the enemy.59 His actions in war mirrored the passion he showed in his 
writings about war. He saw no point to being a soldier if one did not read books 
on war and venerate the soldiers who had passed before him; it was dishonorable 
to wear the uniform of a soldier if the desire to see war was not the most 
consuming feeling one had ever felt. Anyone who was not excited to travel to new 
fields of battles, anyone who was not disappointed that rain canceled practice 
maneuvers, should resign his commission “to some young man such as I wish him 
to be,—a young man mad for the art of […] Eugène; one who will ever be 
convinced that he must do his duty trebly to do it passably.”60 
Charles-Joseph’s Austria was as triumphant as the Holy Roman Empire of 
Prince Eugene. In 1757 Charles-Joseph fought at the Battle of Kolin where 
Frederick II was defeated and Bohemia saved from Prussian occupation. The 
Ligne Dragoons, the regiment of Charles-Joseph’s uncle Prince Ferdinand, 
charged the Prussian infantry and defeated them, leaving Frederick to plead to his 
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own generals, “But my generals, do you not wish to attack?”61 This did little to 
rally the defeated soldiers, and Frederick fled the battlefield. Charles-Joseph’s 
cousin, Charles Alexander of Lorraine, was later defeated at the Battle of 
Leuthen, but Charles-Joseph took command when two superior officers were too 
busy fighting over precedence. This ability to command garnered him a 
promotion to lieutenant colonel.62 The next year he was promoted to colonel and 
put in command of the Ligne Infanteries.63 
While looking back on his first campaigns, Charles-Joseph believed that 
he could not have been prouder of himself if he had been the sole winner of his 
battles rather than a contributor to the victories.64 He exhorted newcomers to war 
to “be you of the blood of heroes, be you of the race of demigods, if glory does 
not intoxicate you continually do not stand beneath her banners. Say not that you 
have a liking for your profession; if that cold word suffices you, embrace another 
[….] Love the profession of arms before all else; love it with passion—yes, 
passion is the word.”65 
Charles-Joseph had very particular opinions on the ideal soldier: no matter 
how hard he worked, how loyally he served, how blamelessly he performed his 
duties, or how much he might know about the art of war, he was only a copy, not 
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an artist like Charles-Joseph’s heroes. The perfect soldier was always aspiring to a 
new ideal. Soldiering was not merely a necessary duty in times of war; it was a 
vocation, a life-long occupation, a dream. Charles-Joseph was disgusted by 
“lukewarm” soldiers who served only to gain favor and blinded sovereigns to the 
scars of honorable veterans: “True consideration belongs to the truly brave, and 
not to those who, pretending to serve, rob the real soldier of his recompense.”66 
Charles-Joseph’s longing for war bordered on obsession: “enthusiasm 
must go to our heads, honour must electrify our hearts, the fire of victory must 
shine in our eyes, our souls must be lifted up as we uplift the banner of glory.”67 
In a century of wars that would wipe out a greater percentage of the European 
population than would be wiped out in the next century, one might find Charles-
Joseph’s words over-romanticized, exaggerated, and immature. He ignored the 
horrors of war and the dangers, even worshiping his father’s bravery instead of 
fearing for his safety when he was a young child. Careful consideration must be 
made for the environment and the atmosphere in which he was raised where the 
hated French were more glorified than a beloved Austria, a monarchy that rivaled 
that of any other European ruler. 
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Memoirs and Eugene of Savoy 
Charles-Joseph began to regret a day that passed without reading or 
writing.68 As much as he desired to serve Austria with his sword, his pen could do 
just as much for Austrian greatness. He mocked the French for their perpetual 
self-aggrandizement: “There is not one little success in the French Armies which 
does not have thirty Historians… our Emperors do not have Historiographers.” It 
was for this reason that Austrian generals such as Eugene of Savoy were little-
known in comparison to French generals like Turenne and Condé; French defeats 
were more celebrated than Austrian victories.69 Charles-Joseph vowed to give 
Austria a voice in the annals of military history. 
In his memoirs, Charles-Joseph related that his first memory was a desire 
to become a second Prince Eugene of Savoy, who was denied a military 
commission in France and so became a general in the army of the Holy Roman 
Empire. His second thought was that “a war was being fought; and it turned my 
head.”70 Though Charles-Joseph idolized Eugene, he was not so far removed from 
Eugene’s glorious past: Eugene had died only a year after Charles-Joseph’s birth, 
and indeed it was Eugene’s victories over the French armies during the War of the 
Spanish Succession that had contributed to the southern Netherlands staying 
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under Austrian rule.71 Charles-Joseph also idolized other generals such as Condé, 
known as le grand Condé for his exploits in the Thirty Years’ War, and Charles 
XII of Sweden, who was both a skilled king and a skilled strategist. The young 
Charles-Joseph’s dreams of war were reflected in his first portrait where the 
seven-year-old prince stands before Beloeil dressed for war in an eastern-
European uniform; he carries a sword and gun.72 
Eugene of Savoy was not unworthy of Charles-Joseph’s hero worship. He 
was credited with stopping the westward expansion of the Ottomans, saving the 
Holy Roman Empire from French conquest, and being a great patron of the arts.73 
No personal writings of Eugene survived even in Charles-Joseph’s time, and an 
official biographer was not appointed until one hundred years after the prince’s 
death. Thus only Eugene’s public life, as seen through records of his military 
conquests and artistic patronage, was known to Charles-Joseph and other Austrian 
subjects. 
Eugene, like Charles-Joseph and many other nobles in Vienna, had a 
mixed European heritage. Eugene’s mother, Olympia Mancini, niece of Cardinal 
Mazarin, was brought from Rome to make a good marriage in France; his father, 
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Eugene Maurice, was the Prince of Savoy-Carignan.74 The House of Savoy 
encompassed the areas of the western Alps, southeast France, and northwest Italy. 
In spite of the mix of ethnicities, its loyalty stood with the Holy Roman Empire, 
and the Emperor had given Eugene Maurice the dukedom of Savoy and an 
Imperial curate over Piedmont.75 Olympia had been brought up with Louis XIV, 
and they were inseparable; some even urged the young king to marry her.76 Once 
Louis and Olympia were married, each to other people, she solidified her position 
at court and sought to retain her influence over the king, resorting to fabricating 
rumors and even involving herself with astrology and black magic, a scandal that 
led to her banishment from France.77 
Eugene had been groomed for a life spent in the church by the choice of 
Louis XIV, but he desired a military career. Having been denied that because he 
was considered weak, he fled to Vienna in the company of Prince Louis Armand 
Conti, son-in-law to Louis XIV and a nephew of Louis de Bourbon, the Grand 
Condé, France’s great general. Eugene’s brother, Louis Julius, had been serving 
in the Imperial army for a year, commanding a regiment of dragoons, but he had 
been killed in a battle against the Turks. In order to avenge his brother’s death and 
defy Louis, Eugene sought to take command of his brother’s regiment, and he and 
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Louis Armand left Paris.78 Eugene’s desertion of the French court would have 
gone unnoticed, but Louis could not let his son-in-law serve the Habsburgs. The 
two princes were caught in Frankfurt. Louis Armand was convinced to return to 
Paris, and Eugene went to Passau, where Leopold I had fled to escape the Turkish 
siege in Vienna.79 
The command of Louis Julius’s regiment had already been passed to 
another, so Eugene had to be satisfied with another position in the Imperial army. 
The Duchy of Lorraine linked Charles-Joseph with the dead general he had spent 
his life studying: Eugene’s first position was in a regiment under the command of 
Duke Charles IV of Lorraine while Charles-Joseph fought under a grandson, 
Prince Charles Alexander of Lorraine, statholder of the Netherlands, a title 
Eugene had once held. 
Many of the Holy Roman Empire’s great military leaders were not 
Austrian by birth but by allegiance. Eugene became one of the many 
cosmopolitan men of whom Leopold I could boast. Eugene’s request to become a 
subject of the Holy Roman Empire reflected his unhappy upbringing in France 
and appealed to Leopold’s desire for allegiance: 
I confess frankly to have reached this decision only after having 
tried to follow my ancestor’s example of serving my country and the 
Bourbon Court with all my heart, and only after having sought service in 
vain many times under the French Crown. But my mother’s fate prevented 
me having a career in the French Army although nothing could ever be 
proved against her or me. I assure you, most merciful Emperor, of my 
constant loyalty, and that I will devote all my strength, all my courage, and 
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if need be, my last drop of blood, to the service of your Imperial Majesty, 
and to the welfare and development of your great House.80 
Eugene gained the command of his brother’s dragoons after he had defended 
Vienna from the Turks. After earning accolades and promotions in the War of the 
Spanish Succession, Eugene also fought in another war against the Ottomans and 
in the War of the Polish Succession. He rose through the ranks of the army, 
became president of the war council in 1703, viceroy of Milan in 1707, and 
governor of the southern Netherlands from 1716 to 1724.81 He fought in 
seventeen campaigns and was wounded nine times; he fought in the Balkans and 
in Hungary against the Turks, and he fought the French in Italy, France, and the 
Netherlands.82 He was in the field until six months before his death, and on 21 
April 1736 Emperor Charles VI made an entry in his diary: “About eight-thirty [in 
the morning] news that Prince Eugen of Savoy, who has been in the employ of my 
house since ’83, since ’97 has achieved great exploits as commander in the field, 
in 1703 became president of the war council, since 1711 has been most useful to 
me in everything, has been found dead in his bed after a long illness. God be 
merciful to his soul.”83 
Unlike Eugene, who did not leave a written legacy, Charles-Joseph 
published his papers in 34 volumes from 1795 to 1811, titling them Mélanges 
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Militaires, Littéraires et Sentimentaires, and he followed with the New Collection 
of Letters by Field Marshal the Prince de Ligne in 1812; many other collections 
were published in his lifetime. One catalogue mentions six volumes of the 
Posthumous Works of the Prince de Ligne printed in Vienna in 1817, yet none of 
these volumes seem to exist.84 Charles-Joseph’s Mélanges, however, indicates 
that they had been written for and, as part of an ancient tradition, bequeathed to 
his regiment with the stipulation that they should not be published until those 
mentioned had died. It was not until 1845 that Charles-Joseph’s grandson 
published two volumes, “Fragments of the History of My Life” and “My 
Posthumous Scattered Thoughts”.85 
Charles-Joseph’s published works were not restricted to his own memoirs. 
In 1809, a work was published that harkened back to his early fascination with 
famous generals, The Memoirs of Prince Eugene, of Savoy: Written by Himself, 
which at first glance appears to be Eugene’s own work. The preface begins with 
the provenance of the alleged manuscript with this princess giving that count a 
manuscript, which reached the hands of a bookseller. The prince’s own preface 
follows: “There are, as I have been told, many Italian and German manuscripts 
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respecting me, which I have neither read nor written.”86 The very manuscript this 
prefaced is one that was not written by the Prince of Savoy. 
The fake memoirs cover the major points of Eugene’s military career from 
the 1680s through the 1730s. One translator’s preface about the manuscript in 
“the Prince’s own hand” leads the reader to believe that the manuscript had been 
found in the 1750s, some twenty years after Eugene’s death, and had been 
circulating among family and acquaintances for fifty years before finding its way 
to George Conrad Waldeburg, a bookseller and printer at Klagenfurt in Austria. It 
is the acknowledgement of Waldeburg that validates the origin and the existence 
of Eugene’s memoirs, but the translator himself believes them to be real: 
There is perceptible, however, in the style of the Prince, a military 
air which coincides well with his actions and character. Another proof of 
the authenticity of this manuscript, is the tautologies of an old man; the 
repetitions, which an author could not commit; the negligences, which do 
not belong to a man of letters: while there is nothing which does not agree 
with the soldier: a tone which would ill become another, but which is 
pardonable in a military man; not always excellent, and sometimes too 
familiar. His style, such as it is, is clear and concise, like his conversation, 
as the Prussian general, Lentulus told me, who had retired to Neufchatel, 
where he died at a very advanced age. He served under him in his last 
campaign on the Rhine, whither he accompanied the great Frederick, then 
Prince Royal. These are sufficient facts, dates, and names, all of which 
may be testified: mine only shall be wanting.87 
In spite of the claims made in Charles-Joseph’s mock autobiography of 
Eugene, some editions with the Prince de Ligne’s name attached and some 
without, little of Eugene’s papers survived his death. Eugene’s niece, who 
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inherited his estate, spent sixteen years dispersing his collections and palaces.88 
Eugene left no memoirs or personal writings, and what correspondence still 
existed was often terse and restricted to military matters. Eugene’s legacy lay in 
the collections of others. 
Though the manuscript contains testimonies that lend a certain amount of 
legitimacy and authenticity to Charles-Joseph’s memoirs of Eugene, history 
suggests that Charles-Joseph had no intention of his work ever being considered 
the actual work of Eugene. In 1742 Eléazar Mauvillon published The History of 
Francis-Eugene, Prince of Savoy. While Mauvillon’s biography begins with 
Eugene’s birth, both contain notations starting in the year 1683, the year Eugene 
left Paris for Vienna; Charles-Joseph ended his work two years before 
Mauvillon’s concludes with Eugene’s death. 
In a review of Max Braubach’s Prinz Eugen von Savoyen: Eine 
Biographie, the author noted that as early as 1829, the collected works of Charles-
Joseph included “Mémoirs du Prince Eugène,” yet authors as late as the 1950s 
used the mock autobiography in their bibliographies. One even commented that it 
was “interesting, but unfortunately too brief; Eugene fought better than he 
wrote.”89 Though Eugene’s official biography, written by Alfred von Arneth, was 
based on selective archival research, a later publication of 21 volumes on 
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Eugene’s military campaigns included both original documents and historical 
fabrications.90 Thus Charles-Joseph’s Memoirs, though a work of historical 
fiction, were no more flawed than the scholarly sources that succeeded it, and as a 
commentary the fictionalized memoir lends validity to the exploits of the Holy 
Roman Empire. 
Eugene spent his last months recuperating from a life spent in the field, 
but Charles-Joseph killed himself in his lust for court. His grandson wrote of his 
last days that “he greatly tired himself: visits, staircases, kings, the court corridors, 
fêtes where he stayed four or five hours on his legs, and above all the desire to be 
everywhere and not to admit that he was tired may have contributed to his 
illness.”91 In the delirium that preceded his death, Charles-Joseph believed that he 
was conducting plays, both on the battlefield and in the theatre, and he uttered his 
last words: “C’est fait.”92 His funeral was a state affair: detachments of infantry 
and grenadier regiments carrying flags bordered with black ribbon accompanied 
his coffin, which had been decorated with his hat, sword, baton, and medals. A 
black knight, symbolizing the tradition of chivalry and the Austrian sense of 
ceremony, escorted the prince to his grave. Austrian, Russian, Prussian, Bavarian, 
French, and British officers made up his entourage. His epitaph connected him to 
the Roman generals he had studied and to the Holy Roman Empire he had served: 
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“To Charles Lamoral Prince of Ligne, general in the army, Praetorian Prefect, a 
brave man, a famous writer. Born on 23 May 1735, died 13 December 1814.”93 
Unlike the perceived Eugene, Charles-Joseph wrote as well as he fought, 
and he had retired to Vienna for a life spent writing in the Imperial court. His 
family heritage and his own travels meant that Charles-Joseph considered himself 
to have seven fatherlands—the Holy Roman Empire, the Netherlands, France, 
Spain, Austria, Poland, and Russia—and he could write on the politics and culture 
of each with equal competence.94 He was not just a prince in the Netherlands; he 
was a prince of Europe. His legacy was not merely dependent upon his ancestry: 
his service as a field marshal in the Austrian army and his writings reveal him to 
be a man of his day, enmeshed in the politics of an Enlightenment-era Europe and 
the passions of the royal courts.95 He was as much responsible for his 
cosmopolitan existence as was his family, those uncles who fought tirelessly on 
behalf of the Holy Roman Empire, those bastard sons who were proud to bear the 
Ligne name, even if illegitimately, those grandparents who died during 
recreational hunts on the family estate. 
Writing about both his time and a generation past, Charles-Joseph left 
some insight into a Europe that was evolving from a time that emphasized the 
divine right of kings into an age when nationalism was rising even as borders 
were blurring. He modeled his life after that of Eugene of Savoy, and the 
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European theatre offered him a fitting stage. Europe was overwhelmed by wars of 
succession that turned into struggles over land, and the life of Charles-Joseph was 
not so different from the life of Eugene. Both men were welcomed by the Holy 
Roman Emperors, and both made their home in the court of Vienna. Charles-
Joseph, however, refused to leave his reputation in the hands of others, and he 
immortalized his own life in his memoirs and saw that they were published. He 
was not just a second Eugene, who devoted his life to the army and little else. He 
was a new Eugene, one who could wield a pen as well as a sword. 
 37 
Chapter 3 
LORDS OF THE FIRST QUALITY: THE HISTORY AND MEMOIRS OF 
PRINCE EUGENE 
The “Preface to the Weimar Edition (1809)” of the Memoirs of Prince 
Eugene, of Savoy, begins with provenance of the manuscript given by the Princess 
of Hildburghausen, the niece and heir of Eugene of Savoy, to the Count of 
Canales, “a very amiable, and well instructed man, and one who always sought to 
be more so.”96 The Count of Canales documented the following scenario within 
his papers: “The Princess of Hildbourghausen, after having related to him a 
variety of things respecting her uncle, said to him, ‘As to warlike matters, you 
must excuse me from them. Here is a small abridgement, written partly in the 
Prince’s own hand, in the period between his last campaign, and his death. Do not 
keep it: read it with attention and return it to me again.’”97 According to the 
editor, the manuscript “was still in his hands, when the Princess died, about the 
year 1752 or 1753. For a long time there was nothing said about it; he lent it, and 
it was returned to him.”98 The manuscript was then passed on to the Count of 
Guasco, a quarter-master-general visiting the Count of Canales: “I will not show 
you the Prince in his morning gown; but I will display him to you in his helmet 
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and cuirass.”99 From the Princess of Hildburghausen to the Count of Canales to 
the Count of Guasco to his aide-to-camp to his daughter to the editor: thus “the 
reader now begins to see the genealogy of what I have printed, and how it has 
happened to be given to the world.”100 
Though “only the conversations which [Eugene] had with various 
individuals, the reflexions, and the last year, are in his own hand-writing,” the 
manuscript could be authenticated by comparing his “long and small hand” to his 
signature in the Imperial Council of War in Vienna.101 Thus the detailed origins of 
the manuscript and the style of writing presented this publication as the words and 
thoughts of Prince Eugene of Savoy. The prefaces of both the German and French 
publishers, as well as the preface of the prince, make it clear that though the 
punctuation and words were chosen for readability, the manuscript itself, the basis 
for the German, French, and English publications, was written by Prince Eugene 
of Savoy. 
Though many Italian and German manuscripts, as well as French and 
English ones, were written, they were not written by Prince Eugene of Savoy but 
by Prince Charles-Joseph de Ligne some years after Eugene’s death. As 
previously stated, Ligne’s contemporaries would have had little doubt that this 
publication was a creative reinterpretation of Eléazar Mauvillon’s The History of 
Francis-Eugene, Prince of Savoy. The texts were so similar as to sometimes have 
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as little difference as the use of the personal pronoun over the third-person. While 
Ligne’s work is highly derivative of Mauvillon’s, the two Eugenes, one published 
for the public and the other hidden away in private papers, sometimes clash, each 
holding different insight to a man who, while famous, few ever knew. 
The Hôtel de Soissons, Paris 
“Some future historians, good or bad, will perhaps take the trouble to enter 
into the details of my youth, of which, I scarcely recollect any thing. They will 
certainly speak of my mother; somewhat too intriguing indeed, driven from the 
court, exiled from Paris, and suspected, I believe, of sorcery, by persons who were 
not, themselves, very great conjurors.”102 Eugene was certainly aware of his 
mother’s scandal as he was sixteen when his mother fled Paris because of her 
involvement with magic and love potions in L’affaire des poisons. Eugene’s 
father had passed away six years before, in 1673, and Eugene was raised by his 
paternal grandmother, Marie of Bourbon, and her daughter Princess Louise.103 
Historians, even the amateur ones, would also tell “how I quitted [France], my 
heart swelling with enmity against Louis XIV, who refused me a company of 
horse, because, said he, I was of too delicate a constitution [….]”104 Louis was 
grateful for his departure, and Eugene swore never to return to France without a 
weapon in his hand. “I have kept my word,” wrote Ligne’s Eugene, and so 
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Eugene had.105 The context of this statement was after a successful French raid 
when Eugene remarked to a fellow soldier, “Did I not declare that I would never 
re-enter France, but with a Sword in my Hand? Lewis banished the Countess of 
Soissons my Mother, and I have now driven from their Houses and Settlements 
some Thousands of his Subjects.”106 
Eugene would eventually lose contact with his family. His youngest sister 
died in childhood, and the other two, Marie Jeanne Baptiste and Louise Philiberte, 
led lives full of scandals that would equal their mother’s. Eugene’s childhood 
home, the Hôtel de Soissons, was closed by municipal authorities because it had 
been turned into a gambling den and brothel by the sisters. Marie was alleged to 
have born a bastard a year and be unable to name the father, and later she became 
the subject of a duel, which caused her banishment from Paris. Three of Eugene’s 
brothers also died unmarried, including Louis Julius; it was his Imperial regiment 
that came under Eugene’s command. Emanuel had died in 1676. Philippe, who 
had been exiled from France because of his “adventurous life as priest, soldier, 
and Venetian sea-captain, wandered about Europe, became involved in England in 
a duel over his aunt, and in an affair with the Duchess of Portsmouth, and 
eventually died of smallpox in 1693.”107 Eugene’s eldest brother, Louis Thomas, 
was a soldier in the French army until a falling out with Louis XIV, after which 
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he traveled to Vienna to ask for a command under his brother. He was the only 
child in the family to marry and procreate, and after his death in 1702 Eugene 
took on his nephews and niece as his heirs.108 In spite of the lack of his own 
children, Eugene “cherished the hope of bequeathing to a member of his family 
and hence to history both his name and the undivided inheritance of his 
elaborately amassed property.”109  
Though Eugene had suffered from the nickname Little Abbot, it was not an 
empty title. Much responsibility lay in an ecclesiastical upbringing, and much 
power attached to the running of an abbey, but Eugene did not have the character 
for the Church, not because the palace gossip said he “was more formed for 
pleasure than piety”110 or because Louis XIV believed that the “young Prince 
appeared very unfit for the Fatigues of War, on Account of the Delicacy of his 
Constitution” but because “his martial Character” made him desire that “the 
Ecclesiastical Benefices his Majesty had conferred on him […] be exchanged for 
some Employment in the Army, which would put him in a Condition of doing his 
Majesty more Service.”111 To compound the insult, other princes living in Paris 
were allowed military commissions. Eugene “cared neither for the success of the 
church, nor of the court. I had enough of society; but I wished to follow the 
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war.”112 Spurred both by the desire to command a regiment and to avenge his 
brother’s death, he left Paris on 26 July 1683 and journeyed to Vienna, the seat of 
Holy Roman Emperor Leopold I, which was under siege by the Turks. 
The House of Habsburg, Vienna 
Eugene’s ties to the Habsburgs transcended his brother’s service and the 
cosmopolitanism of the Holy Roman Empire: his grandfather Thomas Francis, the 
founder of the Carignan line of the House of Savoy, was the grandson of Philip II 
of Spain by the Infanta Catherine, and as such was a great-grandson of Emperor 
Charles V.113 Eugene became attached to Prince Louis of Baden, a cousin on his 
father’s side, and the Duke of Lorraine, who used Eugene to convey “orders into 
the hottest parts of the battle. I had been told that the Duke of Lorraine never 
employed, during the time of action, any but generals to convey or even to alter 
an order, if he needed it. I was duly sensible of the honour therefore, and he 
appeared satisfied with me.”114 Eugene was not the only French prince to 
volunteer for the Imperial army: “Voluntiers came in from all Parts of 
Christendom, to learn the Art of War, in opposing these Infidels. Among others 
the Princes of Conti and Roche-sur-Yon, and of the Royal Blood of France; the 
Prince of Turenne, Nephew of the famous Marshal of that Name; and many young 
Lords of the first Quality, obtained Leave, on this Occasion, to make a Trial of 
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their Valour.”115 Prince Louis Armand Conti had certainly attempted to 
accompany Eugene, but his relationship with his father-in-law, Louis XIV, took 
precedence over his friendship with the Savoyard prince. 
Though Eugene would spend the rest of his life fighting on behalf of the 
Holy Roman Empire against the French, very few battles took place in the Empire 
or in France. Battles were not fought in contested territories but rather in areas 
that were easily reached by roads and waterways and that were able to produce 
enough to sustain large standing armies. Wars between western crowns were often 
fought in five main areas, including the previously mentioned “cockpit of 
Europe,” which encompassed northeastern France and the Netherlands (home of 
Charles-Joseph de Ligne) as entry points to Paris, Versailles, and Germany, and 
northern Italy, which was an entry point towards Vienna and southern France and 
where Eugene spent many years.116 
When the Turks were defeated, the Duke of Lorraine wrote to the Emperor 
that Eugene “contributed the most towards the execution of that design,”117 and he 
gave a “high Encomium of Prince Eugene’s Conduct and Bravery, and attributes 
to him much of the Honour of the Day.”118 Prince Louis of Baden, “an excellent 
Judge of military Virtue, and who that day observed the Conduct of our Hero, was 
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charmed to see how cool and serene he appeared in the Heat of Action.”119 
Eugene was presented to Emperor Leopold I by the Prince of Baden: “Sir, this 
young Savoyard, whom I have the Honour to introduce, will in Time equal the 
greatest Captains.”120 The Emperor “loaded him with Caresses, and already 
foresaw that he would one Day be the Right Hand of the Austrian Family, and the 
Restorer of Glory to the whole German Empire. The Empress testified no less 
Esteem for his Person: And Eugene, for his Part, appeared so affable in the midst 
of Favour, that he was beloved by all the Courtiers, and even by the Ministers 
themselves.”121 Eugene became a favorite of the court in Vienna, and “it cannot 
detract from his natural Modesty, to say he was well pleased with this growing 
Reputation.”122 He was made colonel of a regiment of dragoons on 11 December 
1683 at the age of twenty;123 the next year he was promoted to major-general, and 
in 1688 he was made a lieutenant-general with the promise of further promotions, 
“so rapidly did he advance in military Dignities!”124 He was only twenty-five 
years old. 
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In 1691 Eugene found himself fighting the French at the Siege of Cuni 
during the Nine Years’ War (1688-1687). Either “indiscreetly eager”125 or “so 
engaged in this Action” that he sustained minor wounds, Eugene found himself 
“at the Point of being shot through the Head by a French Trooper.”126 One of the 
dragoons under his command shot the Frenchman before the Frenchman could 
shoot Eugene; both Mauvillon and Ligne related that, though Eugene rewarded 
the dragoon, the dragoon was more pleased with saving his general than he was 
with his commendation.127 
Eugene once again found himself battling the Turks, this time at the Battle 
of Zenta in 1697. The prince received a letter from the Emperor ordering him not 
to pursue battle under any circumstances. Because he “should have sacrificed a 
part of my troops and my own honour” if he complied, Eugene ignored this 
Imperial directive.128 Mauvillon gave greater detail of the incident: “I have chosen 
to insert the Substance of [Eugene’s] Narrative, as it was published by Authority, 
and shall only add to it a few Particulars: As, that the Prince of Vaudemont was 
sent with an Account of it to the Emperor, in a Letter written with Prince 
Eugene’s own Hand; and that the Stile of this Letter is so remarkably modest, as 
to discover the true Character of the Hero who wrote it, and who ascribes hardly 
                                                 
125
 Ligne, Memoirs of Prince Eugene, 40. 
 
126
 Mauvillon, History of Francis-Eugene, 50. 
 
127
 Ligne, Memoirs of Prince Eugene, 40. See also Mauvillon, History of Francis-
Eugene, 50. 
 
128
 Ibid., 51. 
 46 
any Thing to himself.”129 The letter in question was a response to Eugene’s desire 
to attack at the first opportunity. Mauvillon related that Eugene was surprised by 
the injunction but that the Imperial army had been hit by sickness and the reserve 
troops depleted. The chance that Eugene would be defeated in battle and thus lose 
more soldiers was not worth the risk, and “his Majesty thought it more prudent to 
save what was left, than to hazard the Loss of the whole.” Though Eugene was 
aware of the reasons for the Emperor’s order, and “knew better than any Man how 
far it was well-grounded,” he still believed in his resolution, that he did not think 
it proper to retreat when he had already come so far. Thus he concealed the 
Emperor’s order, “in Hopes that the Event would justify his Conduct.”130 
Eugene proved himself in battle and wrote to the Emperor of his victory. 
When he was summoned to Vienna to give his account of the successful 
campaign, he reserved the right to deliver to the Emperor the seal of the sultan, 
surrendered in battle as the spoils of war.131 Both Ligne and Mauvillon gave great 
detail about Eugene’s reception in Vienna, beginning with the fact that Eugene 
believed he would be received well on account of his glorious victory (“a hundred 
times better than I had ever been yet” according to Ligne’s Eugene). Instead 
Leopold I received him “in the coldest manner; more austere than ever, he heard 
me without replying by a single word. I saw, immediately, that I had been 
circumvented during my absence; and that, while I was getting rid of the Turks, 
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the good Christians at Vienna were endeavouring to get rid of me.”132 Ligne left 
out the details of this audience extant in Mauvillon’s narrative, how Eugene’s 
rivals at court emphasized Eugene’s disobedience while the Austrians were 
calling him the “Deliverer of the Empire”. Leopold, in hindsight, “had much of 
that Haughtiness so natural to Sovereigns, which made him jealous of his own 
Authority,” and he was thus made to focus on Eugene’s defiance rather than any 
subsequent accomplishment. Even though Eugene came bearing the Great Seal of 
the Ottoman Empire, he had some difficulty gaining an audience with the 
Emperor, “yet with a Boldness worthy of his Innocence, he gave an Account of 
what had been done, and how Affairs had been left in Hungary.” The Emperor 
neither praised nor punished him.133 
In spite of the Emperor’s cold reception, Eugene had yet to face the 
consequences of his actions. He was confined to the city, rumored to be 
commanded to make an appearance before the Imperial Council of War. In the 
meantime, he was demanded to surrender his sword. “ ‘There is the Sword,’ said 
our Hero, ‘which his Majesty demands: It is still reeking with the Blood of his 
Enemies; and I consent never to resume it, except to employ it in his Service.’” 
While the Imperial court debated Eugene’s merits, the citizenry expressed their 
allegiance by offering him a guard, which he “modestly refuted, ‘in full 
Assurance,’ as he told them, ‘that the Emperor would soon distinguish Truth from 
Calumny, and render him that Justice which he could not help thinking was due 
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his service.’” Eugene was absolved and reappointed commander in Hungary. 
Furthermore, he received a secret commission “signed with [the Emperor’s] own 
Hand, to act as [Eugene] thought proper, without being accountable for the 
Success.” Eugene was also permitted to grant promotions and commendations to 
those who “chiefly distinguished themselves under his Highness, and were most 
strongly attached to his Person.”134 
Ligne played on the indignity felt by Eugene when he was not 
immediately received as the hero at the Battle of Zenta. He described Eugene’s 
statement upon the relinquishment of his sword as half “a gasconade, and the 
other half a base resignation.” He was enraged to be put under house arrest upon 
his trial “for disobedience, and for having performed a bold and hazardous 
action,” and that he might lose his life should he be found guilty. Though these 
details do not appear in Mauvillon’s biography, they provide a more viable 
argument for why the citizens of Vienna felt the need to protect Eugene while he 
was under house arrest, “to prevent me from being removed, in case it was 
attempted to carry me to my examination, as had been talked of.” In spite of their 
zeal, Eugene persuaded them to remain loyal to the Empire. Ligne posited that 
because the city was so small that the Emperor would have heard of this 
outpouring of support for Eugene, Leopold returned his sword “whether from fear 
or repentance,” and upon accepting it Eugene demanded full authority over his 
troops so that he would no longer be “exposed to the malice of [Leopold I’s] 
generals and ministers.” It was “poor” Leopold that gave Eugene unconditional 
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power over his troops. Ligne interjected that Eugene condemned Leopold “for not 
feeling that I merited a more signal of reparation,” and he denied that Eugene felt 
“that, of the three Emperors whom I had served, the first had been my father, the 
second my brother, and the third my master. Pleasing mark of parental fondness, 
to cut off my head for having saved his empire!”135 Thus Ligne created a 
character of Eugene who was not just a heroic servant but a real power, one who 
was hindered by the Holy Roman Emperor and ostensibly only cared for the 
Empire so long as his successes on its behalf were acknowledged. Eugene quickly 
grew tired with the court officials and was equally critical of the Emperor: “No 
one thinks of anything but eating, drinking and gambling; they trouble themselves 
about nothing else… The tragic circumstances in the Empire certainly disturbed 
the Emperor for the space of an hour. But luckily on that same day there was a 
procession, and he forgot anything else.”136 Eugene had no time for court 
squabbles or petty politics, not if he were to preserve the power of the Empire. 
The Question of the Spanish Succession 
The two narratives take a sharp split in 1700, the year Charles II of Spain 
died and left Europe embroiled in war. Ligne focused on Eugene’s desire to outfit 
his palace, Belvedere. While in Vienna, Eugene purchased books for his library 
and the occasional art piece, “some fine cabinet pictures, and some drawings not 
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generally known. I was not rich enough to form a gallery; and I did not like 
engravings, because others could have the same as myself. I never loved 
imitations of any sort, nor talents which consume valuable time.” Though he was 
outfitting his home, Eugene still did not care for court, musing that any music 
played at dinner excused him from making or hearing idle chatter.137 
The year 1700 played a much more important role in Mauvillon’s work, 
but he, too, concentrated on Eugene’s cultural side, citing that Eugene “had two 
Years of Repose from the Fatigues of War, which were not however wasted in 
Idleness.” He spared no cost in forming his library. He wrote the memoirs of his 
campaigns (allegedly). “It may be said of him as it has been of Caesar, that he 
was equally a gallant Commander and a good writer. His Knowledge, especially 
in History, was so universal, that he justly deserved the Epithet of Learned: A 
Quality so far from being incompatible with Heroism, that it is even necessary to 
soften that Ferocity which is too natural to a Soldier.”138 He was a soldier and a 
scholar, the best of men, yet nothing concrete exists as proof of this claim. 
Eugene was a prince by birth, but he was a general by choice, a man of 
genius in Mauvillon’s estimation, and “as he was born for War, it seemed as if 
War sprung up only for him.” Having already bested the Turks in seventeen years 
of war, Eugene was about to experience another fourteen years of battle for the 
Spanish Succession, “the most obstinate and bloody Contests that had ever been 
known.” He was in the “Flower of his Age,” and Mauvillon’s account described 
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him “in the greatest Lustre”.139 Eugene’s success in this war would be no less 
outstanding than the success he had in his youth. 
Before Eugene could marshal his troops, there had to be a catalyst. This 
was the death of Charles II, King of Spain, “in whom ended the Elder Branch of 
the House of Austria” and who “was in so languishing a Condition, that his Death 
was every Day expected.”140 Spain had been undergoing a pattern of problematic 
succession. The legitimate son of Philip IV of Spain, Baltasar Carlos, had died in 
1646, leaving only the illegitimate Don Juan of Austria. Philip then married 
Leopold’s sister, Maria Anna, who had two sons: Philip, who died when he was 
four, and Charles, whom no one believed would survive childhood.141 Philip also 
had two daughters: María Teresa, from his first marriage to Élisabeth of France, 
and Margarita Teresa, daughter of Maria Anna. 
Both Spain and the Empire had assumed that María Teresa would marry 
the Holy Roman Emperor, but Mazarin intervened, claiming María Teresa in spite 
of Louis XIV’s wishes in exchange for France leaving Spanish territories alone. 
As queen of France, María Teresa renounced her claims to the Spanish throne, but 
Mazarin conditioned the renunciation upon a legitimate son of Philip IV living to 
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be king. To maintain a favorable relationship with the Empire, Philip betrothed 
his younger daughter, Margarita Teresa, to Leopold I.142 
Philip IV, however, fell ill, and the French had gained influence in the 
Spanish court. Count Franz Eusebius von Pötting, the Imperial diplomat in 
Madrid, was charged with concluding the marriage contract, and Margarita 
Teresa’s rights to succession were secured over her sister’s. Margarita Teresa 
remained in Spain, and Pötting was unable to quicken her departure for Vienna. 
Leopold I sent another diplomat, Franz Paul von Lisola, to succeed where Pötting 
had failed. Lisola encouraged Philip to write a will securing Margarita Teresa’s 
right to the Spanish throne and Queen Maria Anna’s control of the regency for 
Charles. Philip died in September 1665, and Maria Anna became regent for 
Charles II of Spain; Lisola returned to Vienna with Leopold’s interests in Spain as 
secure as they could be.143 In 1666 Leopold and Margarita Teresa were married. 
Charles II took the throne in 1665 at the age of four, but he was sickly and 
childless, and his death seemed imminent for the thirty-five years of his reign. 
One diplomat suggested that it “would be a shorter way to knock him on the head 
rather than all Europe should be kept in suspense with the uncertain state of his 
health.”144 The question revolved around who would gain power over Spain’s 
expansive holdings in Europe, including the southern Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
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Milan, Naples, Sicily, Sardinia, and Tuscany, should Charles die without an heir, 
which seemed likely. Charles’s two closest relatives were Leopold I and Louis 
XIV, both sons of Spanish princesses (Maria Anna and Ana María Mauricia, 
respectively) and husbands of other Spanish princesses (Margarita Teresa and 
María Teresa). 
Leopold I and Louis XIV shared a mutual dislike of each other in spite of 
never having met. Louis’s resentment of the Spanish wife who had been forced 
upon him and his many extramarital affairs insulted both Leopold’s sense of 
dynasty and of propriety. Leopold saw Louis “as an insufferably arrogant 
hypocrite whose deceitfulness was matched only by his bumptious disregard for 
the conventions of good behaviour” while Louis saw Leopold as a pompous 
young ruler who was constantly in the way of French expansion. European 
politics had given Leopold a taste for how French diplomacy, coupled with 
bribery and extortion, could interfere with the Empire’s goals, particularly when 
the marriage of Louis to María Teresa foreshadowed Bourbon control of Spain. 
When Mazarin died in 1661, Louis further infuriated Leopold by pressuring Philip 
IV to nullify María Teresa’s renunciation of her rights, offering French military 
assistance in exchange for the promise of succession.145 
Louis XIV almost succeeded in shutting out Leopold I from Spanish 
politics. There was no legal precedent for a princess renouncing rights to 
succession, and Maria Anna did little to influence the court in spite of being 
Leopold’s sister. The distribution of Spanish power concerned all of Europe, and 
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before the death of Philip IV, many European nobles pondered a partition of the 
Spanish inheritance so that no European house would gain a disproportionate 
amount of power. Two years before Philip’s death, Imperial Chancellor Johann 
Philipp of Mainz devised a plan that would divide Spain between Louis and 
Leopold in the hopes of avoiding the long-feared war. While this plan seemed to 
be the obvious solution, Spanish nobles would not concede a division of Spain’s 
holdings. Leopold knew that the Spaniards would back a single monarch who 
promised to keep Spain complete, so he refused to discuss any proposal that 
included division, knowing that he would lose his support in Spain and that his 
marriage to Margarita Teresa could be further delayed. Because of rumors that 
Louis was to invade the Franche-Comté and the Netherlands as soon as Philip 
died, Leopold was in a hurry to secure his marriage and his subsequent claim to 
the Spanish succession.146 
When Philip IV died, Charles II assumed the throne with his mother Maria 
Anna as regent. Maria Anna’s grip on Spain slipped when Philip’s bastard son, 
Don Juan of Austria, gained the support of a court friendly to France, and Charles 
was betrothed to Louis XIV’s niece, Marie Louise of Orléans.147 Once Maria 
Anna returned to court after Don Juan’s death, she isolated Marie Louise and her 
French supporters from court. 
The fact that Charles II had no heirs meant that the Spanish throne was 
likely to pass to a foreign prince, either Habsburg or Bourbon. Leopold I 
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cemented the Habsburg claim by marrying his daughter Maria Antonia to 
Electoral Prince Maximilian II Emanuel of Bavaria, a Wittelsbach; their son 
would be a great-grandson of Philip IV. The union between Maria Antonia and 
Maximilian II was also supported by England and the Dutch Republic, who 
preferred that Spain be ruled by neither the Habsburgs nor the Bourbons.148 
The Spanish court welcomed the idea of a Bavarian prince, a male 
descendent of Philip IV, ruling Spain. Charles II’s sister, María Teresa, was 
married to Louis XIV, and their son, the dauphin of France, had a greater claim, 
“had not a formal Renunciation of such Right been made at the Marriage of his 
Parents” when the Bourbon and Habsburg lines were united. Maximilian II was 
still the favored heir, but Leopold I as the head of the House of Habsburg also had 
a claim for his younger son, Archduke Charles II of Austria, and he had 
Maximilian secretly transfer any claims to the Spanish throne to Leopold’s male 
heirs. In return, Leopold promised Maximilian the Spanish Netherlands if the 
Empire inherited Spain.149 
Louis XIV was so “piqued at this Indignity, yet thinking it best for the 
present to stifle his Resentment” suggested a Partition Treaty that would weaken 
the Spanish holdings if the dauphin might take the Spanish throne. This treaty was 
not ratified, and Louis opened negotiations with the Spanish ministers and 
involved the court of Rome in order that Spain might be left to Duke Philip of 
Anjou, second son of the Dauphin. “Meanwhile he kept up his Army as in Time 
                                                 
148
 Ibid., 170. 
 
149
 Ibid., 170. 
 56 
of War, tho’ all the other Parties had disbanded theirs, and marched great Bodies 
of Troops to the Borders of Spain and the Netherlands, there to be ready at the 
first Notice.”150 
Louis XIV’s secondary plan came to pass, and a Spanish minister visited 
the French court “with Advice of the Disposition made in [the King of Spain’s] 
Will, and desiring that the Duke of Anjou, now their Sovereign, may be sent 
among them.” Louis sent both the duke, now Philip IV of Spain, and his army into 
the Spanish territories. “This was the Rise of that long War, the Transactions 
whereof will be the Subject of many subsequent Pages.”151 With the might of 
France behind the throne, the Spanish ministers hoped that Philip IV would be 
strong enough to leave the Spanish holdings in tact instead of dividing them 
among the other houses of Europe.152 
At the Imperial war council, it was decided that it was time to assert the 
Habsburg right to the Spanish crown against the Bourbon claim and that the 
multinational nature of the Empire and its alliances would aid the Holy Roman 
Empire in securing the throne: “The Court of Vienna was sensible it had several 
Friends in Spain, Naples, Milan, and other States of the Spanish Monarchy, who 
would be ready to espouse its Interest, whenever they found it in a Capacity to 
support them. Thus the War was resolved on, in Expectation that England, 
Holland, and even the whole Empire, would join their Forces, to prevent the 
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Storm which threatened all Europe, in case the House of Bourbon should obtain 
all the Kingdoms and State of the Spanish Monarchy.”153 Eugene advised that 
Archduke Charles II lead an army, either into Lombardy according to Ligne or to 
Spain, where “the Catholick King [Charles II of Spain] had applied to [the 
Emperor] for Troops with great Earnestness, and would have received the 
Archduke into Spain before his Death.” Leopold I’s councilors rejected Eugene’s 
suggestions, and “the Emperor experienced too late the fatal Effects of neglecting 
Prince Eugene’s Advice.” Prince Louis of Baden was appointed commander in 
the Low Countries, and Eugene was sent to Italy.154 
In 1703 Count Henry Mansfeld, President of the Imperial Council of War, 
died (according to Ligne) or resigned (according to Mauvillon), and Eugene was 
appointed president in his place to preside over the court. Mansfeld was, in fact, 
promoted but to a position of little importance that had few duties.155 Eugene had 
long been an opponent of Mansfeld, whom one English diplomat described as 
motivated more “by personall than publick interests.”156 Eugene blamed Mansfeld 
for ignoring his correspondence and promising him more troops while telling the 
Emperor that Eugene had more than enough resources.157 Upon his ascension to 
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the post, Eugene’s first thought, as a loyal soldier, was to reform the army, taking 
care that they were well paid in a way they had not been previously.158 Ligne’s 
Eugene took a more aggressive position, not just asserting “that it was impossible 
to carry on war without troops and without money, that they had been wanting for 
the last six months, as well as every other necessary; I wished that the other 
military commands might be better supplied than I had been, which accordingly 
took place.” He was also set to advise the Emperor and change Leopold’s 
philosophy of war: “Your army, Sire, is your monarchy, without that it will revert 
to the Turks, to the French or perhaps, one day or other, to the Hungarians. Your 
capital is a frontier town; your Majesty has no fortress on any side; every one is 
payed except those that serve you. Make peace, sire, if you cannot make war; 
which is impossible without the money of England. What are your ministers 
doing that they take no advantage of the hatred against France, but involve you in 
a war with all France, and even with your own subjects.”159 Because of the state 
of the army in Vienna, Eugene was not able to give himself the military edge he 
believe he needed, and so Ligne’s hero was hindered by the inferior minds that 
had come before him. 
Another hindrance was the Holy Roman Empire’s multiple warfronts and 
ultimately the multiple goals of the war. Although Leopold I wished to limit the 
power of the House of Bourbon, he also wanted to maintain his holdings, 
particularly in Italy where Eugene had been posted. War in Spain was secondary 
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and contingent upon victories elsewhere in Europe, which would force France to 
declare peace, and the undertakings of the Imperial princes in Germany allowed 
the Empire to deploy its troops in the south.160 
Though this was an eighteenth-century war, it was fought with 
seventeenth-century methods and was similarly plagued by seventeenth-century 
problems. The armies had grown, but modes of food production had not. The 
biggest problem for a government raising an army was financing and supplying it. 
Armies of the Thirty Years’ War had heavily depended on supplying themselves 
through a march, living off the land or commandeering supplies from conquered 
towns. With the army growing, so too had preparation, and food and arms were 
collected before a campaign started and stored in multiple locations to be 
accessible to a marching army. Raiding became a form of intimidation rather than 
necessity; conquered areas were robbed of available cash and supplies in order to 
impede the enemy. Money could even be extorted by threatening to burn the 
fields or destroy industry. If the villages paid, they became an ally to the army, a 
source of food and ready cash. An army could only survive if it maintained 
contact with its supplies, whether they were stored in magazines or available from 
local resources: “merely to carry sufficient fodder for horses and draught animals 
as well as the grain, handmills, bricks and firewood to bake bread for any army of 
60,000 men for a month would have needed a transport train of 11,000 carts,” 
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which would have stretched for over one hundred miles.161 While foraging was 
wholly impractical, it was also considered “uncilivised” and a military risk: “the 
conduct of the formal ‘grand forages’ involved almost as many security 
precautions as the proximity of an enemy army” because the result was often 
mass desertions by those unwilling to march without supplies.162 
In 1705 Eugene was encamped in northern Italy facing the French when 
word reached him of the death of Leopold I. Both Ligne and Mauvillon 
expounded on Eugene’s feelings for Joseph I, Leopold’s eldest son and successor. 
Ligne’s opinion on Eugene’s behalf was that he had loved Joseph better but that 
he feared Joseph would care less for war than his father did “as sons generally 
adopt a directly contrary course of proceeding to their fathers.” His fears were 
calmed when he received a coronation gift from the new Emperor: payment for 
his troops.163 Eugene conceded that Leopold was “not without good qualities,” a 
less than generous opinion given Leopold’s favorable treatment of Eugene, but 
that he could not comprehend “how any Spanish and Austrian flatterers could 
attempt to call him Leopold the Great.”164 
Mauvillon lamented that Leopold I was not able to see the French 
defeated. The Emperor, who died 5 May 1705 when he was sixty-five years old, 
so hated the French because of his many wars with Louis XIV that “he would not 
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suffer the French Tongue to be spoken in his Court, tho’ he understood it 
perfectly well.”165 The biographical Eugene had not yet learned to love Joseph I, 
and he greatly lamented the death of Leopold along with the allies and subjects of 
the Holy Roman Empire. He, too, feared that Joseph might not feel as kindly 
towards the army, but along with the payment for Eugene’s troops came a letter, 
which “confirmed him in the Power he had before, and encouraged him to use it 
for the Interest of his Royal Highness.” Joseph hated the French as much as his 
father did, “so that no Alteration happened in the State of Affairs by the Death of 
that Monarch. The War in Flanders: and upon the Rhine was pushed with all 
imaginable Vigour; and the Archduke [Charles II of Austria], supported by 
England, Holland, and Portugal, made great Progress in Spain. All the Allies, in a 
Word, seemed to agree, that no Peace should be made till young Philip was 
dethroned.”166 
In 1707 Joseph I sent Eugene to command the army on the Rhine, the 
command that had once been held by Prince Louis of Baden. Ligne failed to 
mention that Louis was being replaced because he had died. In any case, both 
Ligne and Mauvillon related Eugene’s reluctance to leave his Italian troops. “This 
was certainly some trick of my enemies that I did not wish it, and that I was going 
on prosperously where I was.” Eugene had had much success in Italy but had 
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been forced to waste time putting down a conspiracy in Naples instead of 
humiliating Louis XIV by taking Dauphiné, Languedoc or Provence.167 The 
transfer from Italy to the Rhine was a sign of the Emperor’s satisfaction with 
Eugene, but still Eugene was loath to desert the territories he had just conquered, 
desiring that he be the one to restore peace. His refusal was such that the Emperor 
was inclined to accept it, and Eugene was allowed to remain in Italy.168 It seemed 
that Eugene grew to feel affection for each of the three Emperors he served, but 
that did not mean he did not criticize them. He began to worry that the Emperor 
spent more time hunting and catering to his mistresses than he did administering 
his court.169 
The war advanced, as did Eugene, and he besieged forts in southern 
France. Other great soldiers distinguished themselves in these battles. Prince 
William of Saxe-Gotha, only twenty years old when he was a lieutenant-general 
of the armies of the Empire, England, and Holland, fought with Eugene at the 
siege of St. Catherine. The prince, “a charming figure, and accomplished at all 
points, defended himself like a lion.” Having been warned of an attack, William 
sent a message to Eugene requesting men as the French outnumbered the 
Imperialists by too many. Prince William rallied those who were left with the cry, 
“My friends, let us, at least, die like men of honour.” He was shot twice. Eugene 
“was inconsolable for the loss of the young prince: but I was a little comforted by 
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the destruction of St. Catherine, and by the capture of the two forts of St. 
Margaret and St. Louis.”170 The manner in which Ligne related it breaks from the 
prevailing sense of the Memoirs, which presents Eugene as the only hero of the 
Holy Roman Empire. 
Mauvillon’s retelling was slightly more epic. When Prince William 
received word of the attack, he sent a messenger to Eugene to ask for 
reinforcements. Any aid would arrive too late on account of the great numbers of 
French who attacked “on all Sides with great Fury.” The Imperial soldiers fought 
well and then broke ranks until the “Prince of Saxe-Gotha put them into Order 
again, and animating them by his Presence and his Exhortations, led them on to 
the Enemy, whose Numbers encreased continually.” Even Prince William’s 
charisma could not hold the flailing Imperial army together, and he was shot 
through the head. His last words were “Friends, ‘tis more honourable to perish 
here, than to have it said, The Prince of Saxe-Gotha was beaten out of his Works.” 
The rest of his wing was similarly slain.171 
Eugene returned to Vienna later that year and was gallantly received by 
Joseph I. “I am entirely pleased with your Conduct, except only in one Particular, 
which is, that you expose yourself too much. Take care how you fall again into 
the same Fault, and remember that we shall have more Occasions for your 
Service.” Far from the insults Eugene tolerated at the war council, the praises of 
the court esteemed him as a successful and valuable general. He was offered a 
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command in the Netherlands with the Duke of Marlborough. With Italy having 
been conquered, he was willing to follow the Emperor’s orders, and he planned to 
issue commissions on his way to meet his new army.172 
Ligne read more into Eugene’s first court appearance since he was 
rebuffed at the Imperial War Council. Here Ligne inserted Eugene’s opinions 
about court life that certainly were not consistent with how Ligne himself lived in 
Vienna: “I hate grumblers, even when they have reason to grumble. Idle sallies 
pass from the closet to the parlour, from the parlour to the dining-room, and, from 
the imprudence of speaking before servants, from thence to taverns; and all this 
gradually makes an impression upon the people which may become dangerous.” 
Eugene was certain there would be an awkward encounter between himself and 
Joseph I on account of the many disagreements the two had had in regards to 
military strategy. Eugene took the high road, maintaining “a respectful but easy 
carriage towards him. He behaved kind to me, and scolded me because I had 
exposed myself too much.”173 It is likely that this scolding came after the battle of 
Blenheim, which was an allied victory but one that had put Eugene’s life in 
danger while he commanded with John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough. Though 
the Emperor was pleased with the victory, “he could not conceal that his joy was 
united with fear for the danger in which Eugene was found. He had to ask him 
therefore to take more care for his safety and security in the future because he 
knew how much the Imperial House and the whole alliance is dependent upon 
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him.”174 In return for his valiant service, Eugene received the Stadtpalais in 
Vienna. 
In 1711 Joseph I contracted smallpox. Eugene wished for an audience with 
the Emperor, who was recovering, before he left Vienna again for war, but Joseph 
sent word that Eugene had already exposed his life too much for the Emperor 
“and that he needed it elsewhere, not with the small-pox.” Three days after 
Eugene departed from the Austrian court, Joseph I died from a “heat in the 
bowels” that the College of Physicians could not cure. “I regretted greatly the loss 
of this prince, who was only in his thirty-third year; the first, since Charles V. 
who had any character, and who was not superstitious; and I longed to serve him 
even after his death. I ran to almost all the Electors, to dispose them to secure the 
Imperial crown to his brother; and I went to solicit the Dutch again to continue 
their credit in money and in friendship to the King of Spain, [Archduke] Charles 
II. who became the Emperor Charles VI.”175 There was a rumor that the Emperor 
had been poisoned by the physicians, but Ligne suggested that “we should never 
believe defamatory libels, or these authors of pretended anecdotes, with their 
malignant doubts. For a long time it has been the fashion to make all great 
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personages die of poison.”176 Certainly this was an allusion to L’affaire des 
poisons, in which Eugene’s mother had found herself embroiled thirty years 
earlier. These details did not appear in Mauvillon’s version of the Emperor’s 
death, only that Joseph was sick and that he had ostensibly recovered before a 
relapse took his life.177 
 
The Death of Eugene 
Three Holy Roman Emperors. Five wars. Fifty years spent loyal to the 
Holy Roman Empire. Eugene of Savoy had been President of the Imperial War 
Council for thirty years when the War of the Polish Succession, his last war, 
began in 1733. He had become the symbol of the Imperial army, the only general 
to have won major victories against France. As evidenced by the number of 
wounds he received, his leadership style involved commanding from the 
battlefield. He “showed great personal bravery and had a direct effect on the 
outcome of the fighting; during the wars as a whole he squeezed the most out of 
an inadequate and creaking system, one which often produced armies more 
reminiscent of the Thirty Years War than those of Marlborough.”178 He may have 
demanded much from his soldiers, but he risked his own life standing beside 
them. 
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On 21 April 1736, at the age of seventy-two, Eugene was found dead in 
his chambers, “extinguished dead like a taper.” Upon an autopsy, it was 
discovered that he had choked on his own phlegm, likely a victim of pneumonia. 
“In a word, My Lord,” wrote one English diplomat, “his life was glorious and his 
death was easy.”179 
Mauvillon omitted “the Relation of his pompous Funeral, at which the 
Emperor assisted in Person, and which many Foreigners came to Vienna on 
purpose to see. Those Honours, so justly paid to his Remains, added nothing to 
his real Glory, and their Place here may be better supplied by a short idea of his 
Person and Character.”180 Mauvillon went on to describe the qualities of Eugene’s 
body, mind, and heart, but his funeral was a testament to his years of loyal 
service. Eugene was laid in state, “dressed in a wig and in his uniform of a colonel 
of dragoons: red tunic with gold braid and black velvet facings, and spurred boots. 
Laid out next to him were ‘on one side his cap as Prince, his sword sent him by 
the Pope after one of his victories against the Turks’, a victory which seemed such 
an ago that the observer who wrote the description did not know which one.”181 
His body was processed to the Kreuzkappel of St. Stephen’s Cathedral. Though 
the prince had not been a part of the Imperial family, Emperor Charles VI and his 
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court accompanied the funeral procession.182 Eugene’s heart was sent to be 
interred in a family plot in Italy while his body was buried in Vienna, a fitting 
metaphor for the prince’s life. 
Eugene had devoted his life to three successive Emperors of the Holy 
Roman Empire, not as a subject of the Austrian rulers but as a member of one of 
the ruling families of Europe, believing the House of Savoy to be equal in 
eminence to the House of Habsburg or Bourbon. In spite of his French 
upbringing, he never considered himself French, as evidenced by his defection 
and his hatred of the king. In spite of his close ties to the Habsburgs, he never 
advised the Emperors on personal matters since he was not of their house. Yet 
with so little time spent in Savoy, it seemed that Eugene was not so much fighting 
on behalf of his royal family but that his family allowed him the independence to 
fight for whomever he wanted. What mattered to Eugene was not protecting the 
lands on which the Habsburgs traditionally had a dynastic claim but to fight on 
behalf of those lands that currently brought Austria power, those regions that were 
militarily and politically important: Italy for its strategic location, the Netherlands 
for its ties to England, Germany for its similar fear of French hegemony. 
His death may have been easy and his funeral grand, but his legacy was 
problematic. Since he had never married, he had no children, and his possessions 
were passed down to his niece Maria Anna Victoria, who would later marry 
Prince Friedrich of Sachsen-Hildburghausen. Since Eugene had made out no will, 
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Victoria was allowed to do what she wanted with her inheritance, which troubled 
those who understood what Eugene’s estate entailed: “Would you have believed 
that P. Eugene should dye without a will, that a sister as old as himself [there was 
none], and a niece fifty years old should inherit, the finest library, the finest 
pictures and the finest furniture of all kinds that any one less than a crowned head 
had in Europe. His estates in Hungary return to the Emperor for want of a will, 
and God knows how the rest will be dissipated.”183 Though Eugene was interested 
in preserving his family name through his holdings, Victoria seemed interested in 
nothing but money. His medals and trophies from his many wars, his portraits, 
antique furniture, old masters, sculptures, and landscapes were sold to whomever 
would buy them.184 Over the course of sixteen years, Victoria would live in 
Vienna with her husband while she broke up her uncle’s estate. Eugene’s library 
was purchased by Charles VI, and the House of Savoy purchased much of the art 
collection. Eventually Eugene’s palaces—Belvedere, Stadtpalais, and 
Schlosshof—were acquired by Empress Maria Theresia.185 
King Charles Emmanuel III of Sardinia was given first choice of Eugene’s 
personal art collection as the head of the House of Savoy. In the resulting 
transaction, Charles Emmanuel purchased Eugene’s entire collection of 176 
pieces as cataloged by Victoria as well as a set of ten battle pieces. The broker of 
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this deal was the Count of Canales, the Sardinian ambassador to Vienna and the 
man mentioned in the preface to Charles-Joseph de Ligne’s memoirs as the 
recipient of Eugene’s writings.186 
Ligne’s memoirs end in the year 1734, two years before the death of 
Eugene. It was stated that “since the year 1717, and consequently during eighteen 
years, I have fought no battles; but that was because I wanted men, money, allies, 
and credit at the court, (this word I pronounce reluctantly); and, at length, I 
procured peace to Europe after two intolerable campaigns, in which, if I did not 
acquire honour, I at least had nothing to reproach myself with.”187 Though he was 
in his seventies and largely served in politics, Eugene had still taken a field 
command at the start of the War of the Polish Succession. In spite of his age and 
the many campaigns he had already fought, Eugene felt he held much 
responsibility as President of the Imperial War Council, and that post required 
him to fight in the field until his death. 
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Chapter 4 
A SHARE OF LAURELS: JOHN CHURCHILL AND THE ALLIED ARMY 
England entered the war against France in 1702, but Prince Eugene of 
Savoy was not to meet his English counterpart, John Churchill, Duke of 
Marlborough, until two years later. Marlborough, unlike great generals such as 
Alexander the Great, Napoleon Bonaparte, or even Eugene of Savoy, did not 
distinguish himself in war as a young man; indeed, he was in his fifties when the 
War of the Spanish Succession began, an age “of considerable maturity in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when relatively few men survived to reach 
the traditional lifespan of three score years and ten [seventy years], so great were 
the hazards presented by sickness, crude surgery, over-indulgence (for those 
wealthy enough to afford it) and a score of other pitfalls.”188 In spite of his age, 
Marlborough cut a striking figure: “his features without fault, fine, sparkling eyes, 
good teeth, and his complexion such a mixture of white and red as the fairer sex 
might envy: in brief, except for his legs, which are too thin, one of the handsomest 
men ever seen.”189 He was a soldier and a statesman, a general and nobleman of 
whom England could be proud. 
As Eugene spoke for the Holy Roman Empire, so did Marlborough for 
Queen Anne of England as her “Captain-General and chief Favourite. His 
Highness [Eugene] set forth the Danger of the Empire very pathetically, prayed 
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the Duke to be an Advocate in its Behalf, and guarded against such Objections as 
might be made to the Propositions.”190 Marlborough demanded that the resources 
of the Empire be devoted to his campaigns, and he also wanted Eugene: “It is 
absolutely necessary that I should have a supporter of his zeal and experience.”191 
The two men formed an instant friendship, and George Stepney, an English 
diplomat in Vienna, commented that “our generals live in as perfect harmony as if 
they were brethren.”192 This was not an unfounded observation from an outsider. 
Eugene wrote that Marlborough was “a man of high quality, courageous, 
extremely well-disposed, and with a keen desire to achieve something; with all 
these qualities he understands thoroughly that one cannot become a general in a 
day, and he is diffident about himself.”193 The two generals would fight together 
in four battles over the course of five years, and their friendship would outlast the 
alliance between England the Holy Roman Empire. 
The Duke of Marlborough and the Battle of Blenheim, 1704 
Charles-Joseph de Ligne’s Eugene met the duke at Heilbronn to strategize 
with him and Prince Louis of Baden. Thus began the battle of Blenheim 
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[Blindheim] in southern Germany, the armies of Austria and England against 
those of France and Bavaria. The two generals bonded over an opinion that 
decisive military action was needed. For Eugene, who had spent years as the 
dissenting voice at the Viennese court, this meant he had found someone who 
validated his opinions and who was completely dedicated to destroying Louis 
XIV. In character, the two men were opposites. Where Eugene was so dedicated 
to military success that he had little interest in money, family, or politics, 
Marlborough was a diplomat, politician, and courtier, “able to charm anyone with 
his smile and conversation. He was also a family man, fiercely loyal to his wife, 
intent on creating a dynasty and notoriously mean.” Eugene was the seasoned 
veteran at the age of forty-two; at fifty-five, Marlborough had yet to command a 
major battle. There is little mention of Eugene’s health with the exception of 
wounds incurred in the course of battle, but Marlborough suffered from severe 
headaches, about which he often wrote.194 The two generals differed in 
disposition but agreed on their ultimate aim to bring France to her knees. 
The French had situated themselves in Blenheim and the surrounding 
villages, and Marlborough sought to spur them to the attack by plundering 
Bavaria. This is the first statement in Ligne’s Memoirs of the affection between 
the Prince of Savoy and the Duke of Marlborough: Eugene had permitted 
Marlborough to pillage, Marlborough “who, in consequence, was entirely devoted 
to me. We truly loved and esteemed each other. He was a great statesman and 
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warrior.”195 It was in Marlborough’s interest to incite the battle before French 
reinforcements arrived just as it was “the Interest of the French and Bavarians 
therefore to avoid coming to a Battle” until they had built up their army.196 
The French did not take the bait, and reinforcements arrived. So, too, 
however, did Eugene’s troops, and Ligne states that the armies were evenly 
matched. Both Eugene and Marlborough moved out their armies in the middle of 
the night, sounding the bugles and drums at three o’clock in the morning of 13 
August 1704. The army divided in half, and the enemy was unaware of their 
movements until the sun had risen.197 Crossing “a rivulet,” the Kessel, proved to 
be their first obstacle in approaching battle on the opposite bank though 
Marlborough faired better than Eugene did: “My infantry did well; my cavalry 
very bad. I had a horse killed under me: Marlborough was checked, but not 
repulsed. I succeeded in rallying the regiments, who were, at first, shy of 
attacking. I led them back to the charge four times.”198 The English forces 
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scattered the enemy while Eugene was momentarily pushed back by the French. 
The prince demanded excellence from his army and commanded from the thick of 
things, causing one of his soldiers to comment that it was “almost a miracle that 
he escaped the danger.”199 After his third unsuccessful charge, he shot two of his 
soldiers who were arguing, declaring that he wished “to fight among brave men 
and not among cowards.”200 At last Eugene made another push: “I have no 
squadron or battalion that would not attack fewer than four times.”201 The battle 
ended with the enemy forces driven back to the Danube. “I was under the greatest 
obligations to Marlborough, for his changes of position, according to each 
circumstance.”202 
John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough and commander of the English 
forces, gave his own perspective on events. His dispatches to English secretaries 
and ministers revealed Marlborough’s strategies and thoughts about his time on 
the Continent. On 10 August 1704, Marlborough wrote to Robert Harley, Earl of 
Oxford and Earl Mortimer, Secretary of State for the Northern Department, 
stating that he and Eugene had parted company that morning to oversee their 
respective armies but that Eugene had returned when he had heard about the 
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French reinforcements, “and upon consulting together, we thought it advisable 
that he should be forthwith reinforced, and that the whole army should advance 
nearer the Danube in order to join him if the enemy passed.” The armies were 
therefore divided in order to be more maneuverable, should the positions of the 
French and Bavarians change. While Eugene and Marlborough were commanding 
the battle, “Prince Louis [of Baden] will still be entirely at liberty to send parties 
to burn and destroy the rest of Bavaria, and carry on the siege at the same 
time.”203 
Eléazar Mauvillon gave a more detailed description of Blenheim but first 
played upon the sentiments of the great generals, “that Prince Eugene built upon 
the Valour of his Troops, and their Love of his Person: That Marlborough trusted 
to that admirable good Fortune, which never forsook him [….]”204 The two armies 
divided into eight columns, “the Imperialists on the Right and the English and 
Dutch on the left.”205 The English army crossed over first on bridges constructed 
by Marlborough’s engineers: 
When this was done, the Duke commanded his Foot to pass the 
Rivulet first, and then his Horse. As his Grace had observed the Want of 
Infantry in the French Army before him, he judiciously thought, that by 
drawing up his Horse behind the Foot, the Fire of the latter would be of 
the utmost Service in attacking the Enemy’s Calvary with his; and that he 
should thus oblige them to abandon the Infantry in the Villages. Only 3 
Squadrons appeared at last to dispute his Passage, and those were soon 
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obliged to retire. Their Attempt seemed to be a Matter of Ceremony, rather 
than any Thing else.206 
The banks of the Kessel were more hazardous down the line where Eugene and 
the Austrian army were attempting to cross. With the enemy’s fire drawn towards 
Marlborough’s troops, the Imperialists crossed without incident. Eugene’s foot 
soldiers gained an advantage, but the cavalry was repulsed and left the infantry 
unprotected so that a retreat was ordered.207 
Marlborough’s cavalry was broken by the enemy, “but the French 
Cavalry, finding a second Line, and behind that a third, fell with great 
Precipitation, and abandoned the 8 Battalions, who were all slaughtered by the 
Duke’s Horse, except a few Men that saved themselves by falling down among 
the Dead.”208 Meanwhile, Eugene’s forces regrouped and charged, but Eugene 
“had again the Mortification to see his Horse turn Tail. A Bavarian Dragoon had 
not undoubtedly dispatched his Highness, if a Danish Soldier had not shot him 
dead at the Instant he was going to strike.” Eugene abandoned his cavalry, 
resolving to win the battle with his infantry only. Marlborough had taken the 
French Marshal Tallard prisoner, and the French “abandoned the Field of Battle to 
Prince Eugene.”209 The rest of the enemy troops retreated or surrendered, and 
neither Eugene nor Marlborough pursued. 
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Marlborough again wrote to Harley on 14 August, the day after the battle. 
In addition to relating that Tallard, as well as several of his generals, were 
prisoners of war, Marlborough also stated that “we pushed thirty odd squadrons 
into the Danube, where great numbers of them were drowned, and we obliged 
twenty-six battalions and twelve squadrons of dragoons, all French, to surrender 
themselves prisoners at discretion, so that I reckon the greatest part of M. 
Tallard’s army is ruined.”210 The French suffered a forty-percent casualty rate, 
approximately 20,000 men with an additional 40 generals and 1,150 junior 
officers taken prisoner. The allied army lost 12,500 men.211 
The Battle of Blenheim was a rousing success for the allies of the Holy 
Roman Empire, precisely because Marlborough and Eugene worked in concert. 
Marlborough’s mastery of war was impeccable, his tactics and strategies 
unsurpassed. Eugene’s loyalty to his Empire was unquestionable—Marlborough 
later remarked that he did not believe “the Prince could or would quite the 
Emperor’s service on any terms.”212 Blenheim was “the most decisive of the war.” 
Southern Germany was now in the hands of the allies, and France and the French 
army no longer dominated Europe.213 It was also the battle that established the 
reputation of Marlborough as a military commander, “the champion of the Grand 
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Alliance and one of the great captains of history.”214 Marlborough was often 
given sole credit for the victory of Blenheim, and he was “fortunate” that Eugene 
was “willing to co-operate to the full in accepting Marlborough’s overall direction 
of the struggle.” The victory was attributed to “his firm, flexible control of the 
battle at its different stages, his personal intervention at the places of crisis, and 
his proven ability to weld a multi-national army into an integrated weapon of high 
morale and single-minded purpose”.215 In spite of historians’ different takes on 
the generalships of Eugene and Marlborough, Marlborough would later write that 
“Prince Eugene and I shall never differ about our share of laurels.”216 Both 
generals, however, “exposed their person repeatedly,” reported one officer. 
“Eugen went so far that it is almost a miracle that he escaped with his life.”217 The 
overwhelming result was the armies of the Imperial allies established themselves 
as a major threat, and France was no longer assured in its victory.218 
Funding the War, 1708-1709 
In the midst of a financial crisis, Eugene requested that Marlborough 
travel to Vienna, where he was presented to Emperor Joseph I. Ligne’s narrative 
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stated that Queen Anne agreed to lend 25,000 sterling to aid in the battles in the 
Low Countries, where Marlborough was in command while Eugene was in 
Italy.219 Mauvillon stated that ten thousand Hessians, four or five thousand 
Palatines, and troops from Saxe-Gotha, Bavaria, and Prussia were recruited after 
this meeting to fight in Italy.220 
The Marlborough dispatches settled the matter. He wrote from The Hague 
in January 1706 to George Stepney, an English diplomat in Vienna, that the deal 
to which Mauvillon alluded had taken place in the Netherlands and in the 
previous year. 
I can now assure you that the States have not only consented to the 
sending the seven thousand Palatins in the Queen’s pay and their own to 
Italy, but have also found a fund for the augmentation of three thousand 
men desired by the Elector Palatin as a condition of his letting his troops 
march; and they are resolved likewise to join three thousand men more of 
old troops to these seven thousand Palatins, so as to make a body of ten 
thousand men to reinforce Prince Eugene’s army [….] I dispatched a 
courier at the same time to Vienna to inform the Emperor of the good 
news, that he may not only comply with such conditions as the Elector 
may reasonably desire from him for so seasonable an assistance, but 
likewise press the immediate march of the first four thousand men. This 
you may believe that court will be very ready to do, since they reap a 
double advantage from it, first by quelling the troubles in Bavaria, which I 
hope so great a body of troops may easily do on their march without losing 
too much time, and then by restoring their affairs in Italy, which seem to 
be in a desperate condition.221 
A subsequent letter confirms the recruits from Saxe-Gotha for Italy.222 As for the 
money lent to the Holy Roman Emperor, Marlborough laid out the proposition for 
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Stepney as agreed upon by Queen Anne: a sum of 250,000 sterling was to be lent 
over a period of five months at an interest rate of eight percent per year for the 
funding of Eugene’s campaigns in Italy.223 For the rest of that year, Marlborough 
and Eugene merely corresponded about their relative victories and defeats in the 
Low Countries and Italy. 
The two generals met again in 1708 at The Hague to confer with their 
allies before departing once again to their respective commands. Eugene proposed 
two projects in the Rhine and Mosel, which would require thirty thousand men in 
the Low Countries, men the allies at The Hague were disinclined to provide. 
Marlborough, however, believed that “it is very necessary we should be in a 
condition to act offensively on this side, that we may have an eye at the same time 
on our affairs in England to prevent and deter the enemy from the thoughts of 
another invasion, which they might be inclined to if we should weaken ourselves 
too much in Flanders.”224 The States-General, however, preferred to maintain a 
defensive stance until convinced by Marlborough and Eugene. 
Another issue on the table was aiding the crown of Spain, claimed by 
Archduke Charles II. Marlborough had written to Secretary Boyle about garnering 
troops for Spain: “it was agreed to lay aside the thoughts of sending the thousand 
horse, considering the great charge of their transportation; and besides that when 
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the rest of the Palatins and the Imperialists that are waiting for a passage arrive, 
they will make up a body of about nine thousand horse, which, it is my thought, 
may suffice.” Eugene offered to recruit more soldiers out of the Empire to replace 
those sent to Spain on condition of receiving English money for it. Marlborough, 
knowing “the Queen was very averse to giving any levy-money,” passed on the 
proposal with a request for a speedy response, “the four thousand men in Italy 
being in the meanwhile out of service, since they will not be sent to Catalonia, nor 
can they be employed elsewhere till I receive your answer.”225 Though both Ligne 
and Mauvillon’s Eugene seemed to be always in concert with Marlborough, the 
duke’s dispatches reveal some dissent. In another letter to Secretary Boyle, 
Marlborough cautioned Queen Anne against providing levy-money for the four 
thousand soldiers in Spain, thinking “it is very unreasonable to comply with these 
terms while [Her Majesty] obliges herself at the same time to maintain these 
troops in Spain: especially considering how much she has done already for the 
King [of Spain], and the little assistance he has had from his brother [Emperor 
Joseph I].”226 Thus, unless the court of Vienna was willing to match funds, 
Marlborough did not think it prudent to comply with Eugene’s scheme. A 
compromise was reached: Queen Anne offered twenty crowns for every private 
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man Eugene could recruit to the sum of twenty thousand pounds.227 With matters 
set in Spain, the two generals could once again concentrate on the Low Countries. 
Upon his departure from The Hague, Eugene took a roundabout route, 
stopping to confer with Electoral Princes in Dusseldorf, Hanover, Leipzig, and 
Frankfurt and convince them to remain in support of Emperor Joseph I, giving 
them a rendition of the “your army is your monarchy” speech that he had once 
given to Emperor Leopold I: “It is for your interest: a great Emperor would live at 
your expense, were you not [great], and perhaps would find himself better off. 
One is obliged to preserve your country thus. If you do not protect yourselves in 
defending it, take care that another Louvois [French minister of war] does not 
give the whole Empire to fire and blood.” In order that his enemies not discover 
that he was parlaying with so many Germanic rulers, Eugene spread the rumor 
that doctors had ordered him to spend some time at the baths in Schlangenbad for 
the sake of his health.228 
Marlborough and Eugene met again in Belgium where Marlborough was 
encamped at Asch with the French on the other side of the Dender tributary; this 
was the beginning of the Battle of Oudenaarde in East Flanders. Eugene 
demanded to know if Marlborough intended to engage the French. “It is my 
intention, and I perceive with pleasure, but not with surprise, that we are both of 
opinion, that without that, they would cut off our communication with Brussels: I 
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wish, however, to wait for your troops.”229 Eugene advised that it was not wise to 
give the French time to attack. Despite the years of war, France was still capable 
of fielding a huge army from a large population. Their generals may not have 
been on par with Eugene and Marlborough, but their sheer numbers meant that 
they could hold onto an advantage while the Imperial army had problems hiring 
troops from the German princes.230 
The army marched without waiting for Eugene’s reinforcements from the 
Mosel to reach them, covering fifty miles in sixty hours to meet the French army 
at the Scheldt River. When the French general was aware of their presence, he 
remarked that “the devil must have carried them, such marching is impossible!”231 
Because the allied army had moved so quickly, there was little time for the French 
generals to position their columns or perfect their strategies. Marlborough and 
Eugene urged their army forward. The French generals disagreed on a strategy, so 
half the army stayed back, causing one general to complain afterwards that “I 
cannot comprehend how 60 battalions and 180 squadrons could be satisfied with 
observing us engaged for 6 hours and merely look as though watching the opera 
from a third-tier box.”232 
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Ligne gave an account of “our perfect harmony. My affairs were going 
badly on the right, which I commanded. Marlborough, who perceived it, sent me a 
reinforcement of eighteen battalions; but for that I should hardly have been able to 
keep my position.” With the aid of reinforcements, Eugene’s Prussian troops 
pushed through the French lines. Eugene returned the favor to the duke, 
reinforcing him on the left to a close victory.233 “After a Cannonading with some 
Field pieces, the Fight began, and the Fire was most terrible, every inch of 
Ground being disputed with the utmost Obstinacy: But the Confederate Troops, 
encouraged by the Presence of these two Heroes, animated by their Example, and 
led to the Charge by them in Person, broke the Enemies, and obliged them to give 
Ground.”234 The allies of the Holy Roman Empire may have been inferior in 
number, but they were more than equal in bravery, and they used their 
surroundings—the hedges, ditches, and trees—to cover their attack.235 
The French may have seen their enemy as devils, but “they ought to have 
taken for Gods the Generals who commanded them. And indeed, Prince Eugene 
and the Duke of Marlborough, while they were present every where, drawing up 
and animating the Troops, leading them to the Charge, sharing the Danger with 
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them, and making them triumph, more justly deserved to be called Deities than 
the old Romans, who assumed that Honour.”236 
One of the French prisoners taken by the allied army, the count de Biron, 
gave an interesting perspective of the two generals: “He was struck by an almost 
royal magnificence at Prince Eugene’s quarters and a shameful parsimony at 
those of the Duke of Marlborough, who ate the most often at the tables of others; 
a perfect understanding between the two in the conduct of affairs, of which the 
details fell much more on Eugene; a profound respect of all the generals for these 
two commanders but a tacit preference on the whole for Prince Eugene, without 
the Duke of Marlborough being at all jealous.”237 To that same French prisoner, 
Eugene remarked that Louis XIV had refused his brother a command that their 
father had once held, saying that Louis preferred to promote one of his own sons 
and keep the post in his family rather than deliver it to the House of Savoy. 
“However it is impossible not to feel rather pleased sometimes when one is in the 
position to make him regret his contempt.”238 The prince’s free time in battle was 
often taken up in discussing the art of war, “seeing that he does not write any 
more than he needs to,” and he was claimed to have said that councils of war were 
only held when no one wanted to actually make war. As to his lack of writing, he 
had never written up his affairs except when required “because as soon as an army 
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was arranged in an order of battle everyone ought to know what they had to 
do.”239 Eugene was the fighter, the general who wanted nothing at court. 
Marlborough, on the other hand, was the charismatic diplomat, and these two men 
together had done much to shake France. “Just as Marlborough willingly let 
himself be led by Eugen, so too was the case of the army, and this motley army 
coming together from the troops of various commanders had the sight and service 
of a compact united whole.”240 
More reinforcements for the allied army arrived from the Mosel valley, 
rendering their forces as strong as the French. The Imperialists pushed the French 
out of the Netherlands, and Eugene suggested besieging Lille. The States General 
at The Hague disagreed, but upon Marlborough’s concurrence the allies agreed 
upon a plan of action with Eugene leading the siege while Marlborough 
commanded the covering army.241 In spite of his agreement that Lille should be 
taken, Marlborough related later that that he did not believe it could happen as 
early as his ally desired. Still, there were some advantages: the movement of 
multiple armies would intimidate the French and perhaps provoke a peace treaty; 
“and if this fail, in case they have not some powerful diversion from other parts, it 
is probable, trusting to their great numbers, they may venture a battle at the 
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opening of the campaign.”242 In another letter, Marlborough confessed more 
uncertainty, this time in regards to the troops: “were our army all composed of 
English the projection would certainly be feasible, but we have a great many 
among us who are more afraid of wanting provisions than of the enemy.”243 
The two generals scouted out the plain from where they would launch an 
attack, and that same day they caught a scout who was attempting to announce to 
the French marshal in the fortress that Burgundian troops were marching to their 
aid.244 Eugene’s desire to strike quickly, before reinforcements arrived, proved a 
necessary tactic. Marlborough lent five thousand English soldiers to Eugene, but 
tragedies befall even the greatest of heroes: “I led them into the midst of the fire; 
but a ball above the left eye overthrew me, in a state of insensibility. They thought 
me dead, and I thought so too.”245 Eugene was likely to die, or at least go blind, 
but neither happened. Marlborough visited Eugene the day after the wound, 
finding him “dressed, and ready to go abroad: But as Wounds in the Head are not 
to be slighted, his Grace and some other Persons of Quality, prevailed upon his 
Highness to continue in his Chamber for 2 or 3 Days.”246 
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Eugene had retired from the field in the midst of a stalemate, and 
Marlborough took command while Eugene recuperated. “I have been every day 
since at the siege,” Marlborough wrote to the Earl of Sunderland. “We made an 
attack yesterday in the evening and possessed ourselves entirely of the tenaille on 
the left, and likewise made a lodgment on part of counterscarp.” This would not 
be an easy victory though. Marlborough lamented that his situation was such that 
“the lateness of the season, the slowness with which the engineers have proceeded 
in their approaches, and the great difficulty we shall meet with in bringing up a 
further supply of ammunition, as to make us doubt of the success of the siege.”247 
The stress of full command took its toll so that after a summer of headaches he 
felt “almost dead.”248 Eugene, however, shot in the head, showed few signs of 
stress, even when there was an attempt to poison him.249 
The siege of Lille was by no means an easy victory, but it was a victory. 
The fortress “was in itself as strong as Art could make it, defended by a numerous 
Garrison, under one of the bravest Marshals of France, and several other 
experienced Generals; provided with all Manner of Necessaries, and encouraged 
to a vigorous Defence by the Approach of a powerful Army, equal, if not superior 
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to that of the Allies [….]”250 Eugene eventually returned to the field, and 
Marlborough relinquished his command, telling Eugene to make a public display 
of going about his everyday business in order that the army might see that he 
suffered no ill effects from his wound.251 On 9 December 1708 the French 
relinquished the citadel, and Eugene and Marlborough allowed the garrison to 
retreat to France.252 By the end of the year, the allies controlled all but the 
southern areas of the Netherlands as well as areas in France around the fortress of 
Lille. In spite of the overwhelming French numbers, the allies had had a 
successful year. “He who has not seen this,” remarked Eugene, “has seen 
nothing.”253 Marlborough and Eugene were given equal credit for the successful 
season. Though England was contributing funds to the Imperial army, 
Marlborough did not treat Eugene as his subordinate, nor did Eugene treat 
Marlborough as his apprentice in command. 
Eight years of war had tired both French and Austria along with their 
allies, and Louis XIV met with several deputies of state, including Eugene and 
Marlborough, at The Hague. “The Allies [of the Holy Roman Empire] would 
abate nothing of what they had fought for, but insisted upon an entire Restitution 
of the Spanish Monarchy to the House of Austria, and the Surrender of several 
                                                 
250
 Mauvillon, History of Francis-Eugene, 284. 
 
251
 Ligne, Memoirs of Prince Eugene, 127. 
 
252
 McKay, Prince Eugene, 117. 
 
253
 Schulenburg, Leben und Denkwürdigkeiten, I, 368. Qtd. in Henderson, Prince 
Eugen, 167. 
 91 
Fortresses and Territories to the other Confederate Powers.” In spite of the toll the 
war had taken on France, Louis XIV rejected the conditions.254 
Marlborough trusted implicitly the prince’s judgment in all matters of war, 
and Eugene adopted a strategy that involved moving from fortress to fortress, 
which had worked for him in Italy. Eugene suggested that the next attack be on 
Mons in the Hainaut province of Belgium in the hopes that the French generals 
“will be tired of being so prudent.”255 The attack on the fortress would be the 
prelude to the Battle of Malplaquet in northern France. The allies received word 
that the enemy was moving nearly sixty battalions and fifty squadrons more than 
they had the previous year from Italy, Spain, and the Rhine to Lille, requiring that 
the besieging force be augmented as well. Though the allies received ten thousand 
men from Prussia and six thousand from the Netherlands, the forces were 
unevenly matched. Still, Marlborough hoped that, “with the blessing of God upon 
the goodness of our troops, we shall be able to disappoint their measure.”256 
The spring and summer of 1709 were wet ones, and though the army was 
advancing in order to engage the French, “the continued rains and ill weather for 
three weeks together having obliged the troops to march more slowly than was 
intended, and given time to the enemy to entrench a large tract of ground, and 
likewise to fortify the avenues to their camp, making the roads leading to it also 
                                                 
254
 Mauvillon, History of Francis-Eugene, 286-287. 
 
255
 Ligne, Memoirs of Prince Eugene, 139. 
 
256
 Marlborough, Letters and Dispatches, IV, 435-436. 
 92 
extremely difficult,” Marlborough decided to wait so that they were not fighting 
both the weather and the French.257 
Eugene’s affairs were going on so well that he “wished to decide those of 
Marlborough’s on the left, which went on slowly.” The Dutch had sustained many 
casualties with Marlborough gaining no advantage. Eugene sent his cavalry to 
reinforce the Dutch and English troops, but they, too, were pushed back. Eugene 
was once again wounded, grazed by a bullet behind his left ear. Instead of 
withdrawing from the field of battle, he continued to fight, refusing to have his 
wound seen to. “To what purpose, if we are to die here? If we live, there will be 
time enough in the evening.”258 
At last Marlborough made some headway, and the French troops retreated 
when their marshal was seriously wounded. “I think it is not over-rating it to say, 
that the loss of the two armies amounted to forty thousand men: those that had not 
been killed, died of fatigue.”259 The number of casualties for the allies was 
catastrophic: 25,000 dead while France suffered only half that. Even veteran 
soldiers were affected by the dead. One commented that his troops “endeavoured 
to the utmost of our ability to get out of the noise of the wounded, but found it 
almost impossible, except we had gone three or four miles distance, for all the 
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hedges and ditches were lined with disabled men.”260 The slaughter also had an 
effect on Marlborough, but Eugene was indifferent. His years of war had taken 
their toll, and he seemed to accept the cost of battle. In spite of the casualties, 
Eugene and Marlborough never regretted their decision to attack, but the soldiers 
under their command did: “both our generals were very much blam’d for 
throwing away so many brave men’s lives, when there was no occasion: it was the 
only rash thing the Duke of Marlboro’ was ever guilty of; and it was generally 
believ’d that he was pressed to it by Prince Eugene.”261 
The End of the War of the Spanish Succession 
In spite of England’s aid and the Duke of Marlborough’s unflagging 
loyalty to Eugene of Savoy, the ministers of the Holy Roman Empire were never 
certain what England hoped to gain by fighting on behalf of the Habsburg claim. 
Ostensibly England feared a united France and Spain, as did the Empire, but once 
France’s army had been soundly routed by the Imperial allies, England was in a 
position to reconsider. Emperor Charles VI wanted Eugene to present a plan for 
invading Spain with the help of England and her allies; he especially wanted first-
hand knowledge of any talks of peace with France. 
Eugene traveled to London in 1712 with an assurance from Marlborough 
that he would be well received in spite of reports that the English public 
considered him a warmonger: “The reports you have been given of the attitude of 
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the English people to you are an insult to us; in truth everyone is dying to see you, 
and I am quite certain that you will be received everywhere with the respect and 
applause due to Your Excellency personally and to the services you have rendered 
Europe.”262 By the time Eugene reached London, Marlborough had been 
dismissed from his court appointments, the victim of a scandalous tract published 
against him. The Holy Roman Empire had never contributed enough to the war, 
the tract claimed, leaving England to finance and fight it while the Imperial 
generals claimed all the glory. Marlborough was implicated as the man who did 
not do enough to assert England’s superior influence on the Continent.263 The 
English ministers reiterated this to Eugene, and every proposal he made for a new 
campaign and more contributions from the Emperor was met with self-
aggrandizement and verbal abuse for the Empire’s dependence on English troops. 
Eugene only spent a few months on this lost cause and set sail for the Continent 
with a message for the Emperor: the English were no longer his allies.264 
The war would continue for another two years, ending in 1714 with the 
Treaties of Utrecht and Rastatt. The Holy Roman Empire took control of the 
Netherlands, Milan, Naples, Sardinia, and Tuscany. The Bourbon candidate was 
officially recognized as King Philip V of Spain, but he renounced his claim to the 
French succession, somewhat decentralizing the Bourbon influence in Europe. 
The Empire had not won much after fourteen years of fighting, and the fact 
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remained that a Bourbon still occupied the Spanish throne.265 France did not lose 
much territory, and though Philip was no longer in line to inherit another crown, 
the French King ultimately saw his vision realized. England fared better given 
that they had no personal interest in the Spanish succession; her involvement had 
always been political. Colonial and commercial power increased, and England 
was granted Minorca and Gibraltar in the Mediterranean, thus widening its 
maritime power. Though England had fought on the side of the Empire, the result 
of a Bourbon on the throne instead of a Habsburg was the desired outcome. Their 
support of Archduke Charles II had been contingent on his brother Joseph I 
having an heir; when Joseph died and Charles had claims both to Spain and 
Austria, England feared another monopoly, this time a Habsburg one with a 
united Holy Roman Empire and Spain. The great dynasties of Europe were once 
again settled with France, Spain, and the Holy Roman Empire duly separated, and 
the fear of French hegemony under the House of Bourbon was quelled.
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Chapter 5 
CONCLUSION 
The similarities between Charles-Joseph de Ligne’s Memoirs of Prince 
Eugene, of Savoy and Eléazar Mauvillon’s The History of Francis-Eugene, Prince 
of Savoy are too numerous to be a coincidence and too obvious for Ligne to think 
he would fool any of his readers. The detail of the preface, however, suggests that 
some research went into the publication and advertising of Ligne’s work. The 
careful construction of the provenance, that the Count of Canales had received the 
work from Princess Maria Anna Victoria of Hildburghausen herself, ostensibly 
while she was selling Eugene of Savoy’s estate to the King of Sardinia, lends an 
air of legitimacy to the manuscript. Perhaps someone included the preface with 
the manuscript when it made its way to a publisher after Ligne’s death, or perhaps 
a memoir of Eugene’s once existed before the destruction of his estate. Whatever 
the case, as an author Charles-Joseph de Ligne never meant for someone to read 
his manuscript and think it was penned by the great Eugene of Savoy himself. 
Though Eugene’s estate did not survive, his legacy did. Napoleon 
Bonaparte ranked him among history’s greatest commanders along with 
Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Julius Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, and 
Frederick the Great.266 Some historians may disagree with Bonaparte’s 
conclusion: Eugene had no mind for military innovation and continued fighting 
wars with the same methods that had been used fifty years prior. This was a 
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turning point in military modernization, a subtle and slow change from the 
mercenary armies fighting for dynasties to the standing armies of modern nations. 
What cannot be denied is that Eugene made the antiquarian system work. 
Though the Holy Roman Empire wielded much influence in Europe, its army had 
never been one to be feared. Eugene changed that, at least for a time, and the 
Imperial army by the time of Charles-Joseph de Ligne rivaled that of France. 
Perhaps the biggest criticism of Eugene was that he was too charismatic, too 
influential, for “he left no school of officers nor even an army able to function 
without him.”267 If all of Eugene’s opinions had been followed, perhaps a 
Habsburg would have once again sat on the throne of Spain. If Louis XIV had 
allowed Eugene to serve in his army, perhaps the House of Bourbon would not 
have had to fight a war for fourteen years. There are enough mentions of Eugene 
to create a historical background for this great general, but he also remains a man 
of mystery, little known outside of the Germanic countries where he is held as a 
hero. 
Eugene’s legacy exists in both fact and fiction. Since no memoirs of his 
are extant, Ligne’s revival of Mauvillon’s biography served to keep Eugene in the 
historical memory of the Holy Roman Empire until he was appointed an official 
biographer. While Ligne’s Eugene may tend to be full of himself, it is only 
because Mauvillon speaks of him so highly; the Duke of Marlborough’s letters 
corroborate that his contemporaries thought him brave and tireless, and the 
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historical record confirms his long military career and his political influence. 
What cannot be known is what Eugene thought of himself. 
Eugene’s friendship with Marlborough garnered him a place in English 
history. No book about Blenheim, England’s greatest victory, is complete without 
a chapter on Marlborough’s comrade in arms, a man who would get off his horse 
and fight with the infantry. The two generals supported each other throughout 
their campaigns, ready to run to the other’s aid if a need called for it. When 
Eugene was forced to retire from the field because of a wound, Marlborough was 
ready to take command. When the French seemed to gain the upper hand, Eugene 
traveled from Italy to help Marlborough in the Netherlands. The two men were 
polar opposites in experience. Marlborough was in his fifties before he 
commanded his first major battle when Eugene had been fighting since he was 
twenty years old. Marlborough was the urbane politician, able to conduct his 
affairs on the battlefield as well as he kept abreast of national and international 
politics. Eugene cared for nothing but to pay his soldiers and fight against the 
enemy; the only thing he cared for more was to report a victory to his Emperor. 
The War of the Spanish Succession was the last of a series of wars that 
were fought against French hegemony in Europe. In a sense the Holy Roman 
Empire was defeated: Charles II of Spain had been the last Habsburg monarch on 
the Spanish throne. Though Philip V of Spain had been removed from the French 
succession, Spain and France remained allies through the next century, united 
under the House of Bourbon while the House of Habsburg licked its wounds. 
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The War of the Spanish Succession was not Eugene’s first war, nor was it 
his last, but it was a war in which he shined. His influence transcended the great 
houses of Europe, and his reputation survived his death. It took only six years for 
a comprehensive biography to be written; fifty before someone attempted to 
emulate him; and a hundred before an official biographer combed all the Imperial 
archives for anything he could find about Eugene’s life and time in the field. His 
estate may have been dispersed, but his legacy remained in the memories of those 
who saw him as a great soldier and a great subject of the Holy Roman Empire. 
The Memoirs of Prince Eugene, of Savoy by Charles-Joseph de Ligne has 
too long been disregarded by modern scholars as the whimsical fancy of a 
nineteenth-century prince. The Memoirs and the source material from Eléazar 
Mauvillon’s The History of Francis-Eugene Prince of Savoy are the closest 
contemporary sources to Eugene, closer even than any Imperial work on the 
prince. These works were in greater demand for an English-speaking audience 
than any nineteenth- or twentieth-century large-scale scholarly work. Not only did 
Ligne never intend to fool readers with his Memoirs, it would hurt scholarship 
little if he had: his and Mauvillon’s books are corroborated by archival research. 
They are certainly no less historical than any other work that has appeared in the 
centuries since Eugene’s death, and they are in fact the closest publications to 
Eugene’s life.
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14 May 1643: coronation of King Louis XIV of France 
26 May 1650: birth of John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough (Devon) 
18 July 1658: coronation of Holy Roman Emperor Leopold I 
18 October 1663: birth of Prince François Eugène of Savoy (Paris) 
1683 – 1699: Great Turkish War 
 11 September 1697: Battle of Zenta (Serbia) 
1688 – 1697: Nine Years’ War 
1 November 1700: death of King Charles II of Spain (Madrid) 
1 November 1700: coronation of King Philip V of Spain 
1701-1714: War of the Spanish Succession 
 9 July 1701: Battle of Carpi (Italy) 
 1 September 1701: Battle of Chiari (Italy) 
13 August 1704: Battle of Blenheim (Germany) 
 14 May 1706 – 7 September 1706: Siege of Turin (Italy) 
 29 July – 21 August 1707: Battle of Toulon (France) 
 11 July 1708: Battle of Oudenaarde (Belgium) 
 12 August 1708 – 10 December 1708: Siege of Lille (France) 
 11 September 1709: Malplaquet (France) 
 24 July 1712: Battle of Denain (France) 
5 May 1705: death of Leopold I (Vienna) 
5 May 1705: coronation of Holy Roman Emperor Joseph I 
17 April 1711: death of Joseph I (Vienna) 
12 October 1711: coronation of Holy Roman Emperor Charles VI 
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1 September 1715: death of Louis XIV (Versailles) 
1716 – 1718: Austro-Turkish War 
16 June 1722: death of Marlborough (Windsor) 
1733-1738: War of the Polish Succession 
23 May 1735: birth of Prince Charles-Joseph François Lamoral Alexis de Ligne (Brussels) 
21 April 1736: death of Eugene (Vienna) 
13 September 1745: coronation of Holy Roman Empress Maria Theresia 
1756 – 1763: Seven Years’ War 
13 December 1814: death of Charles-Joseph (Vienna) 
 
